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ABSTRACT 
This project argues for the importance of considering contemporary corporeality in 
light of new structures of knowledge, focusing on space and time, communication, 
and science and technology and looks for evidence of shifts in these areas at a 
qualitative, experiential level. 
Structures of knowledge are in the process of radical transformation which 
correspond with shifts in three key areas - space, language and technology. Central 
to these shifts are alterations to the ways we understand and experience our 
subjective and bodily location. This argument is developed in the context of the 
Enlightenment, where these key factors are explored as fundamental to significant 
transformations in explanations and experiences of corporeality. 
The interaction between new ways of knowing the world and ways of knowing 
corporeality in the historical analysis is demonstrated in order to establish the 
validity of four main research questions in a contemporary context. These are: 
firstly, in what ways do current configurations of space, language and technology 
suggest an altered corporeal experience? Secondly, how might new 
scientific/technological models, and particularly cartographies, inform explanations 
of corporeality? Thirdly, in what ways might corporeal experience be seen to be 
revalidated within emergent contemporary structures of knowledge? And finally, to 
look for places where qualitative evidence of a new experience of corporeality might 
be demonstrated. 
The first chapter examines new technologies, new forms of communication, and the 
processes of globalisation to show firstly that the key factors which led to radical 
alterations to corporeality in the past are present and secondly to show the 
prevalence and significance of disruptions to scale, location and boundaries in a 
contemporary context. Chapters Two and Three demonstrate in depth the 
interactions of space, language in defining the body. Chapter Four examines 
twentieth/twenty first century science to demonstrate a departure from classical 
science and outline the dramatically new models for explaining the world that these 
provide. 
In conclusion it is argued that corporeality is refigured materially, conceptually and 
perceptually in relation to emergent ways of knowing the world and that the 
authority of the imaginary and of the tactile in contemporary thought is indicative of 
a new validation of corporeal knowledge. It is suggested that by examining the 
science and experience of medical imaging techniques a qualitatively different 
experience of corporeality might be demonstrated, where concepts of interiority and 
exteriority and oflocation are transformed in powerful correspondence with 
transformations in space, language and technology. 
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NOTE. 
This project was undertaken and developed as a Phd. Unfortunately, due to family and 
financial pressures, completion became urgent and the work has been adapted to an MPhil. 
Amidst general doom and gloom about the way the world is going, I needed to express a 
sincere optimism about this new world. I think we have forgotten too easily how things 
were before these varied cultural freedoms became our lives. 
We are in the process of intense transition, which makes it vital to document what is now, 




CONTEMWORARYINTERPRETATIONS OF THE BODY 
IN RELATION TO NEW FORMATIONS OF SPACE, 
LANGAUAGE AND TECHNOLOGY. 
1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTION. 
"If the convergence of new spatio/temporal perspectives with new modes of 
communication and new scientific/technological models operate in articulation with a 
new formation of the subject and new ways of understanding and experiencing the body 
(as to be demonstrated in the historical analysis) what will be the impact of comparable 
current developments on the contemporary body? " 
This project was initiated by readings of feminist theories of subjectivity, where identity is 
discussed variously as contingent, multiple, fluid and culturally constructed. Much of this 
theory has an overt anti-Enlightenment agenda: non-objective, non-fixed, non-
phallocentric and against met anarrative s. While these theories were useful as new tools by 
which to explain bodily subjectivity, they did not answer questions about how a refigured 
bodily subjectivity might be experienced at the sensory corporeal level. 
This led to an interest in the possibilities for fluid identity allowed by virtual interaction 
and so to a reading of Mark Poster's essay "Postmodem Virtualities" (Poster 1996), 
where he begins by comparing the contemporary subject with the subject in the late 
middle-ages, just prior to the emergence of the period of Enlightenment. (1) 
(1) The beginnings of the period of Enlightenment are identified here as the late fIfteenth century when 
the "discoveries" of Columbus and the work of Copernicus dramatically altered conceptions of the 
boundaries of the world. The emergence of Classical Science in the late seventeenth century is understood 
as a progression of Enlightenment thinking, however, the period is identifIed here as the emergence of 
new knowledge before being developed into the full blown structured discipline of Classical Science. 
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... the technically advanced societies are at a point in their history similar to that of the 
emergence of an urban, merchant culture in the midst of the feudal society of Middle 
Ages .. ./ A new identity was constructed ... among the merchants in which a coherent, 
stable sense of individuality was grounded in independent, coginitve abilities. In this 
way the culutral basis for the modem world was begtm, one that eventually "vould rely 
upon print media to endcourage and disseminate these urban forms of identity. In the 
twentieth century electronic media are supporting an equally profound transformation of 
cultural identity. (poster 1996, p183/4). 
This analogy between the late middle ages and the late twentieth century (where the 
convergence of new ways of commmricating with transformation in space and with new 
media brings about new ways of identifying the self) foregrounded the importance of 
positing today's subject not in opposition to the Enlightenment subject but rather of 
finding the comparisons, as well as significant differences, between the Enlightenment 
subject and the contemporary subject. The connection was also made for the first time 
between new media, new geographical exploration (or spatial transformation) and new 
subject identity. The idea was formulated that the subject is undergoing a period of 
transformation not just in theory, as a consequence of feminist and poststructuralist 
thinking, but in real terms in relation to specific cultural, geographical and technological 
changes. 
The next text I came to was Sawday's investigation of anatomical explorations in 
Renaissance culture (1995), which revealed both the depth and extent of commonality 
between the two eras. Sawday shows that anatomical explorations were rooted in and 
dependent upon, in terms of language and approach, the "discoveries" of the "new" world, 
and demonstrated how these articulated with new structures of knowledge and new 
meanings of corporeality. (2) 
There was the realisation that the resonances between the periods are as powerful as the 
oppositions. In this early period spatial changes and revelations led to an impulse toward 
controlling and mastering space, at the same time as anatomy revealed the spatially 
complex bodily interior and Copernicus' treatise told of a heliocentric universe. This 
(2) Corporeality is the quality of having or being a material body; bodily substance. (Concise Oxford 
Dictionary) 
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coincided with the development of the printing press - a new technology of 
communication. The comparisons between this era and that could not be more striking. 
Amongst all this change a new individual emerged into a new world with new models and 
metaphors for explaining the world. What Kuhn calls "picking up the other end of the 
stick", (see p78) but on a grand scale. Knowledge was opened up. Science was made 
possible. The realisation was that the same sorts of things are happening now - but faster, 
and that a new sort of individual would therefore again be expected to emerge in direct 
correlation with the metaphors and models of new knowledge. While the Enlightenment 
individual was understood as a bounded thing containing an autonomous individual, this 
construction has changed so that the collective, in this case new structures of knowledge, 
is no longer understood as monolithic but rather as culturally and socially produced, 
vario usly differentiated and not fixed. The individual who operates in articulation with 
these forms of knowledge is thus also defined in terms offluidity and multiplicity. 
Sawday demonstrated that the discoveries and transformations of the early Enlightenment, 
or Renaissance, operated in direct articulation with transformations in the meanings, 
understandings and experience of corporeal existence. So as new knowledge structures 
were developed and the concept of a (male) rational, coherent, thinking individual 
emerged, perceptions of and approaches to the body also changed and became separated 
from both the internal soul and the exterior world, and most importantly were made 
distinct from the knowing, rational subject: in short corporeal knowledge was invalidated. 
The question this then demanded was: if new structures of knowledge have become 
evident at a corporeal level in the past how might features of contemporary ways of 
knowing the world become evident corporeally? 
I then started to look for works that would link theories of the late postmodem age with 
corporeal experience. How might altered structures of knowledge - the new universal, 
global, local, quantum perspectives, new communication systems, the dissolution of 
boundaries, the disruption of ideas of interiority and exteriority - which exemplify the late 
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postmodern, globalised world, be found at a corporeal level? I( historically, the body has 
been made sense of anew by the models of geographical terrain or the machine, how will 
scientific and technological models o( for example, the interface, quantum and universal 
scales, or virtual interaction make new sense of corporeal existence? (The three key 
features are summarised as space, language and technology, however in the contemporary 
analysis time is discussed alongside space and science alongside technology.) 
Common daily evidence would seem to testify to alterations in our bodily experience. We 
can, via ultrasound, endoscopy and Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Imaging (NMRI) 
techniques, see our internal organs in real time, we are able to talk to a person (or people) 
anywhere, anytime via the internet or using a mobile phone, we can place a nicotine or 
hormone replacement patch on our skin and experience rapid internal relie( we can play 
simulational computerised games and fly or morpho Post-structuralist theories across 
disciplines focus on exchange across boundaries and fluidity of identity, and artistic and 
cultural production is preoccupied with the body and bodily fluids (exhibiting a fascination 
with the grotesque as it did in the early Enlightenment). However, I was unable to locate 
a theory to explain the articulation between emergent ways of thinking and living in the 
world with emergent ways of experiencing the body in the world. It appeared that there 
was still work to be done on the actual corporeal experience of living within these new 
spatio-temporal formations and of interacting with these new technologies and new modes 
of communication; the actual experience of being the multiple, diffuse, unstable subject 
that Poster defines as characteristic of the late postmodem age (poster 1996, p191). Mary 
Douglas (Douglas, 1966) has usefully focused on exchange across borders of the body in 
relation to social structures but not in a relationship with the new models of science or 
new interactive technologies and modes of communication. 
In the historical analysis it is shown that the emergence of a new structure of knowledge 
was based on the interaction of new spatial formations, new technological models and ne\v 
forms of communication, and that these key factors can be seen to be, in retrospect, 
inextricably linked with new ways of understanding and talking about the body -
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subjectively and materially. So given that these key features, space, language and 
technology, are again in the processes of radical transformation it appeared plausible that 
amidst a contemporary restructuring of knowledge our ideas and experience of 
corporeality could be expected to correspond and interact with these changes. The 
particular interaction of these key features with corporeality has not, to the best of my 
knowledge, been systematically expanded in a contemporary context and it was on this 
basis that the research question was developed. 
Although this work does not claim that the body is gender neutral, discussions of the 
gendered body are thoroughly explored by others (Irigaray 1985, 1983, Butler 1990, 
Grosz 1994, etal.) and so not expanded here. Similarly, while the body is understood as, 
at least partially, culturally specific, analysis of the body in relation to different cultures is 
again left to the work of others (hooks 1990, Said 1985, Bhabha 1994, et.al.), and it is 
acknowledged that this writing is from a white, western and female perspective. 
So, this project reviews the literature dealing with space and time, science and technology, 
communication and language and the articulation of these with the corporeal body and 
brings these readings together to argue that a new understanding and experience of 
corporeality is emerging in correlation with these identified features of the contemporary 
era. 
The project chooses not to focus upon modes of production, or cause and effect, because 
the interest lies not in why these various processes are occurring but rather in the 
particular relations between these processes and the body. It is recognised that by siting 
the work within a field of knowledge, rather than in relation to specific causes and effects, 
that generalisation will occur; this is considered justified by the depth of contextualisation 
and by the demonstrated prevalence of these elements across a range of disciplines. 
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1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The selection of literature and the readings to which it is subjected are based upon the 
project outlined above. The literature reviewed has been selected on the basis of critical 
theory of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, aiming to re-evaluate the 
relations between the significations and significance of embodied subjects and material, 
conceptual and perceptual environments. 
Three main bodies of literature have been examined: new feminist perspectives on 
embodiment, postmodernist theories with a focus upon space and time and technology and 
what are here broadly termed post-colonial theories whose interest is the location of 
marginal subjects, with a view to identifying problematics, commonalities and spaces for 
intervention. These works are interested in the body in its relationship with culture and 
society, and technologies of the body which are subject to new forms of regulation and 
legislation. It is through a critical evaluation of the selected literature that the 
methodology has been developed and the research question formulated. 
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON EMBODIMENT. 
Feminist perspectives on embodiment were developed throughout the 1990s, in part these 
arose as a response to new critical negotiations with strands of post-structuralist theory. 
As demonstrated in chapters Two and Three, in a period of transformation the body tends 
to be foregrounded as the site of intense cultural activity; a preoccupation with the body is 
evident in artistic production and television programming for example and the body has 
been a primary subject for feminist theory in the last two decades. Of particular interest to 
this project is the work of Elizabeth Grosz (1993, 1994), who focuses upon the exchange 
between interiority and exteriority where the surface of the skin is the site of exchange, 
and the work of Judith Butler (1990, 1993) and Donna Haraway (1985,1988). 
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Butler's influential Foucauldian analysis of the subject, as created in interaction with 
knowledge and power, was one of the earliest key works in a transdisciplinary 
preoccupation with bodily subjectivity, for example philosophical (Butler 1990, 1993, 
Benhabib et.al., 1995, Scheman 1993), anthropological (Moore1994) and geographical 
(Massey 1993, Rose 1993). Haraway offers an ironic, imaginative and politically driven 
analysis of the cyborg (hybrid of organism and machine), suggesting that the cyborg could 
find political freedom by escaping the desire for ultimate or complete knowledge through 
the abandonment of history. 
One of the difficulties with these works is that the subject is conceived of in purely 
discursive terms. In Butler's writing the subject comes into being only in an interaction 
with culture. This is a useful philosophical method for thinking in new ways about the 
means by which we define ourselves and are shaped by culture but with no reference to 
how it feels to be a body - the subject is dissolved into signification, or discursive effects 
or, in other works, to the psyche (Braidotti 1991), also her insistence on the subject as a 
purely cultural construct seems untenable, particularly in the light of recent genetic study. 
Haraway's call to become a cyborg and escape history is brave, but also largely 
metaphorical. Her work is politically driven and most useful in that she is interested in 
dissolving boundaries~ organism/machine, nature/science for example. In these ways these 
works have initiated a project by offering stimulating and useful analyses, but also by 
demanding further questions about how it feels be a body spatially and temporally located 
in a physical environment, which requires more than a decentred, discursive explanation. 
The writing of Sadie Plant (1996a,b, 1988) is of particular interest because she offers an 
optimistic discussion of the operations of new technologies as compatible with and 
expressive of feminine experience. The writing is also important in that it uses new 
technological models, digitisation, the network and the interface, as explanatory of 
subjectivity, focusing on connectivity and invalidating concepts of centre and periphery. 
The neural net, Plant says, operates in a way that disrupts old epistemological models, it is 
exemplary as a new model for both thinking and explaining the world, as well as operating 
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in the world, and marks a departure from specular, patriarchal economy. "Neural nets 
function in a way which has less to do with the rigours of orthodox logic than with the 
intuitive leaps and cross-connections which characterize what has been pathologized as 
hysteria" (Plant, 1996, p3 31). This offers an indication of the ways in which new models 
and metaphors might be developed as descriptive of the body in physical interaction with 
its environment and so could be explored as potentially viable models to describe 
qualitatively different perceptions and conceptions of bodily experience. 
Plant's work approaches in a contemporary context some of the key points raised in the 
historical analysis; that different modes of communication can bring about shifts in subject 
identity and also a reconfiguration in the prioritisation and validation of the different 
senses in relation to knowing the world. This is important because a valorisation of sight 
as an objective and detached sense can be seen as intrinsic to the development of science 
as a discipline, and in the process whereby knowledge became detached from corporeal 
experience. Plant asserts tactility to be the dominant sense in contemporary 
communications: "Communication cannot be caught by the gaze, but is always a matter of 
getting in touch, a question of contact, contagion, transmission, reception and 
connectivity. If sight was the dominant and organising sense of the patriarchal economy, 
tactility is McLuhan's "integral sense'" (plant, 1996, 332). An epistemological shift such 
as this refiguration of the sensory hierarchy is supportive, in theory, of an alteration to 
corporeal experience. 
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POSTMODERN THEORIES WITH A FOCUS UPON SPACE, TIME AND 
TECHNOLOGY. 
This body of theory was also developed during the late twentieth century and is important 
because of its emphasis upon the social and cultural implications of new technologies. 
The work of Paul Virilio (1997) focuses on speed, new concepts of time and distance, loss 
of intimacy and of the journey, and destruction of geographical space by technologies, and 
so is of interest However his analysis is apocalyptic, where technology not humanity is the 
determining agent and his prediction for the corporeal body is atrophy and inertia 
Jameson's work (1992) is a theoretical analysis ofpostmodem cultural production where 
he asserts the ahistoricity and dislocation of the postmodern period. His analysis is 
informative of specific contemporary relationships to time and duration, but the theory is 
entirely self-referential so that, while mourning the dislocation from history and 
depoliticization ofpostmodernity, it chooses not to consider social and cultural indications 
which might mark a departure from these. 
The work ofBaudrillard (1995), brings together for the first time the study of daily life 
with semiology to develop an analysis ofhyperreal simulated culture. The focus on the 
impact of technology upon the subject is useful, however, Baudrillard focuses exclusively 
on signification, predicting the utter dislocation of the subject within culture, where the 
only remaining viable political action is nihilism The deterministic tendencies of these 
works preclude positive political or cultural development and present only pessimistic 
predictions for the corporeal subject and body. 
The historical analysis carried out in chapters Two and Three demonstrates the severance 
of knowledge from corporeal experience in the processes of the Enlightenment and it is 
suggested that a revalidation of corporeal knowledge might be expected in articulation 
with emergent contemporary structures of knowledge. None of the above theories engage 
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with this possibility, instead they predict the opposite, a devaluation, a stagnation of 
corporeality. It is in part as a response to such pessimistic theories, which were dominant 
in the 1990s, that this project was initiated. 
The writing of Mark Poster has been most influential because he takes account of 
postmodernism and the impact of technology yet also sees the positive and progressive 
features of contemporary culture and understands these processes to have a real, material 
effect on the individual subject. 
Poster brings together theories of the postmodern with theories of new communications -
defining postmodernism as that which "indicates communication practices that constitute 
subjects as unstable, multiple and diffuse" (poster 1996, p 191). Poster understands 
technology to be one cultural factor among many, and so not deterministic, and sees the 
democratising and positive potential of new technologies while recognising the unequal 
distribution and access of these currently. Most pertinently, for this project, Poster 
explains virtual technology as having the potential to effect a shift in concepts of material 
embodiment and also as legitimising imaginative and playful elements in the formation of 
identity, so revalidating imagination in a relationship with knowledge. 
"Virtual realities are fanciful imaginings that, in their difference from real reality, evoke 
play and discovery, instituting a new level of imagination .... By directly tinkering with 
reality, a simulational practice is set in place/ which alters forever the conditions under 
which the identity of the self is formed" (poster 1996, p 189/90). 
David Harvey's seminal work "The Condition of Post modernity" (1989) describes "the 
compression of space and time" which it seems has become such common currency that 
this phrase is now often used without mention ofhis authorship. Harvey, a geographer 
who focuses on political and economic systems, is important for this project because he 
explains the complex shifts in our spatial and temporal experience with apparent simplicity. 
Although he does not fit easily into this category ofpostmodem theorists, he has various 
problems with postmodern theory; his writing is specifically concerned with space and 
time and, to a lesser extent, technology and he describes transformations in these areas as 
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having a direct effect on our material, cultural lives as well as on our sense of self in 
relation to the world. 
POST-COLONIAL THEORIES 
This body of work falls under the umbrella of post-colonialism These theories are 
informed by postmodernist discourse but with a focus upon space and particularly 
marginal subjects and the operations of centres and peripheries. While these theories 
relate clearly to the idea that a new subject may be emerging in articulation with new ways 
of imagining the world, precisely the sorts of subjects that were excluded by 
Enlightenment discourse, and that these new subjects succeed by crossing boundaries (bell 
hooks 1990), this body of theory is as useful in developing a methodology as it is in 
developing the research question. 
Methodologically and theoretically these works aim to disrupt dualistic discourse by 
focusing on in-betweens (Bhabha 1994) or third spaces (Soja 1996, Lefebvre 1991) and in 
doing so disrupt the concept of exteriority and interiority. In this way it is fitting for the 
research question which is concerned with the changing articulation and interaction of 
body and environment and especially the exchange between corporeal interiority and 
exteriority where the bodily surface, skin, is the interface or the site of exchange. So, 
these theories are in alignment with the emergent structures of knowledge that are of 
interest to this project in that they focus on exchange across borders and disruption of 
categorisation. As the research question is concerned to see how these new ways of 
thinking are evident at a corporeal level these theories, or approaches, are most fitting for 
they correspond theoretically and methodologically with the aims of the research question. 
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1.3 METHODOLOGY AND ORIGINALITY. 
This is a multi-disciplinary, textually based, analytical project which operates by bringing 
together the work of others, in an original synthesis. Broadly; the methodology developed 
through a reading of the literature and especially postcolonialist theory, as outlined a\:x)ve, 
provides the encompassing approach to the project, the underlying discourse. 
In relation to the way the research has developed, this discourse is apparent in the way a 
number of overlapping arguments are utilised each bringing in different aspects of the 
same elements (space, language, technology and the body) in various discussions with the 
intention of layering and cross-referencing the evidence in support of the research 
question. 
Chapters Two, Three and Four are an interpretation of the events of the Enlightenment, 
the scientific revolution and twentieth century science. The theme of all chapters is the 
relation between the identified key factors, space/time, language, science and technology 
and the focus is on the implications of these for understandings and experiences of the 
body. These chapters synthesise the work of others in order to demonstrate the validity of 
the research question. 
It is worth noting that the fourth chapter, which outlines the underlying principles of 
contemporary science, has been largely reliant on popular scientific books. These books 
are best sellers, they testify to the cultural availability and popular currency of new and 
difficult scientific concepts and as such were appropriate sources for this chapter. 
The final chapter describes how we might, in a contemporary context, demonstrate and 
explore evidence of a qualitatively different experience of corporeality in direct articulation 
with the key themes of the historical and contemporary analyses. It argues that the 
authority of the imagination and tactility in contemporary thought relates to a revalidation 
of corporeal knowledge. It also proposes that by looking at the processes, the experience 
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and science of Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Imaging all the key elements of the discussion 
are evident and most significantly, notions and experiences of exteriority and interiority 
can be shown to be disrupted. So this last section proposes qualitative methods of 
research as well as discursive and textual methods, although it is beyond the limitations of 
the MPhil to carry out this qualitative research. 
The originality of this project is broad. Firstly, the argument that spatial shifts, in 
articulation with new technologies and modes of communication, result in radical 
transformation in systems of knowledge has not, as far as I am aware, been developed in 
this particular way by others. Secondly, the comparative analysis of the direct interaction 
between the identified features with meanings and experiences of the body is, to the best 
of my knowledge, original. The brief textual analysis and proposed study ofNMRI 
imaging as evidence of transformation in concepts and experiences ofbodily interiority 
and exteriority is an original idea, as is, lastly, the argument that the tactile and the 
imaginary converge at the bodily level to revalidate corporeal knowledge. 
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1.4 INTRODUCTION. 
This first chapter is concerned with the main hypothesis: namely that structures of 
knowledge are in the processes of radical transformation which correspond with 
dramatic changes in three key areas - space, language and technology and that, in 
accordance with these alterations to the ways we understand and experience our 
world, alterations to the way we understand and experience our bodily existence - our 
corporeality - can also be expected. This hypothesis has been developed from the 
critical and selective review of historical literature, in chapters Two and Three, in 
which these key factors are identified as fundamental to significant transformations in 
meanings and experiences of corporeality historically. This chapter indicates the 
relations between technologies of communication, spatial and temporal frames, and the 
languages and models by which we describe and understand the workings of the 
contemporary situation, in the West (1), as corresponding with shifts in conceptual, 
perceptual and material knowledges of embodied selves and subjects. 
As a whole this project will trace ideas about the ways in which our systems of 
knowledge operate to delimit or define the ways in which we are able to talk about and 
make sense of corporeality. In Chapter Three, the Enlightenment and Scientific 
Revolution (2) are discussed as founded on the premise of a rational, coherent, stable 
individual, and corporeal experience is shown to have had little or no authority in 
relationship to this. The association of vision with truth and knowledge, enabled a 
metaphorical detachment of sensual experience from knowing. This was achieved by 
the association of seeing, not with the physical and subjective eye, but with the light of 
( 1) This does not refer only to the Western World or indeed to all of the Western World, it is rather a 
term meant to describe culturally diverse, technologically advanced., richer parts of the world, as there 
are substantial parts of the globe where the developments of globalisation are ineffectual, or have 
largely a negative impact. In some of the poorest parts of the world a person may have no running 
water but have access to a mobile phone. So, "Western" is utilised to explain that access and control 
of these developments is unfair and uneven and operates as part of economic distribution. 
(2) The Enlightenment and Scientific Revolution. These periods are termed as distinct for ease of 
description but are understood as part of a progression, a development of thinking which has 
characterised modem approaches to knowledge and the body. Enlightenment discourse is understood. 
as reaching its ultimate conclusion in the establishment of Classical Science which became the 
dominant doctrine of the modem world. A marked departure from this line of progression is 
identified as occurring in the early twentieth century with the work of Einstein and also arguably. 
Freud. 
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truth. A distance was imposed between the body and knowledge and this detachment 
was facilitated by disguising the underlying metaphorical basis of that knowledge. 
In articulation with these processes, language is central to and definitive of experience. 
The words we have available to describe our feelings or to explain our thoughts, and 
the authority that these words hold, are inherent to the limits within which the world 
and our place within the world are made sense of, and to the significance or validity 
accorded to various experiences. These words, in operation with available conceptual 
models and tools for understanding new technology and science, are foundational to 
explanations of the operations of the body. In the most basic of terms, geographical 
terrain and the machine have had dominant currency as explanatory metaphors for the 
body in the past - analogies between the computer and the brain (plant 1996), the body 
and interface (Moore 1994, Braidotti 1991), are current examples. New spatial and 
technological or scientific models, by offering new ways of imagining and new 
metaphors for describing the spatial body operating within a spatial environment are 
useful tools by which to make sense of corporeal being. Or rather, as explanatory 
tools are expanded, the breadth of validated experience is also expanded or altered. 
as well as allowing linguistic and conceptual developments, spatial and technological 
change affects our sense and experience of location which, in turn, affects our 
corporeal experience, materially and subjectively. Theories of fluid, multiple, 
dislocated subject identities have driven all major strands of late twentieth and early 
twenty first cultural theories (feminism, poststructuralism and postcolonialism, see 
Introduction) and the material effects of these shifts, the forces of globalisation, are 
definitive of our era. The consequences of comparable transformations in the past 
have resulted in a complete refiguring of the meanings of the body and, retrospectively, 
have resulted in a new sense of self and of community (see pp54/55). 
In the following chapter the Enlightenment body is shown to have occupied an 
intermediary position between discoveries of the "new" world and discoveries of the 
bodily interior and to have become the focus of philosophical and theological debate 
In contemporary terms, the body occupies an intermediary position between recently 
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discovered universal and quantum scales and between the "real" and "virtual" worlds, 
as well as being the material and ethical focus of new biomedical techniques and 
cultural production. 
As part of these large scale processes a refiguration of sensual experience is also 
occurring: "Iflight is a thing of value, the sense of sight and the power of being visible 
are linked together by a very precious bond, such as unites no other sense and its 
object" (Timmeaus cited Keller and Grontkowski 1996, p189). These tenets of 
Platonic philosophy were established in an era when the visual in a literate age 
surpassed the oral, the spoken word, as the authoritative media. Vision superseded 
sound and a whole new approach to knowledge and language were born (see p64/65 ). 
In relationship to new media and virtual technologies today, the power of being visible 
is, in certain arenas devalued. The capacity of sight to render the visible and reveal the 
"truth" is not always authoritative, and if the association of seeing with believing is 
complicated, as it is by computer animation, computer games and so on, then the 
authority of sight is also complicated. So, within the authority of vision a separation is 
occurring. For example, in many current forms we see things that we know are 
fictitious, or highly subjective (heavily edited, digitally modified) and yet we are able, 
for example, to believe the pictures which are being sent back from Mars. Now, it is 
suggested here and developed in conclusion, a renewed emphasis on tactility and 
imagination as tools for understanding a changing world marks a shift in sensory 
experience that itself is an indication and correlate of a fundamental shift in structures 
of knowledge. In the context of the subsequent historical analysis it is argued that this 
sensory shift, in interaction with new languages and conceptual models, will underpin 
new interpretations of corporeality. 
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1.5 THE CONTEMPORARY BODY. 
Within the culture of discovery in the nascent stages of the Enlightenment, the 
dominance of the map as a tool for making sense of the new was essential. The 
methods of cartography - the establishment of borders, claiming of territory - were 
transposed directly onto the newly discovered physical interior, in anatomical 
exploration (as shown in the next chapter). This model is explained here as 
fundamental to the tendencies of the structures of knowledge that subsequently 
developed and also as definitive of a developing language of the body. The articulation 
of the compartmentalised, self lother approach with the methods of classification, 
which were developed as a method for processing vast amounts of new information, 
have been vital elements in the structuring of modem thinking, and reached maturity as 
the doctrine of Classical Science - the dominant explanatory discipline of the modem 
world. These ways of understanding a changing world are shown in the following 
chapters to have had a direct effect on meanings and experiences of corporeality. 
Tendencies in emergent forms of contemporary mapping are thus of central importance 
as signals to the ways in which new knowledge might be structured, and thus 
corporeality newly interpreted. The collapse of boundaries is immediately evident as a 
theme common to the material and cultural effects of globalisations (3) and to theories 
of the self and theories of culture (see Introduction). This is also central to new 
scientific understandings (see Chapter Four), where an emphasis on fluidity, 
connectivity, and spatio/temporallocation is apparent. As the significance of national 
borders diminishes - physical location is freed of many constraints (at least for those 
with access to a mobile phone, plane ticket or e-mail). This alteration to the behaviour 
of boundaries is apparent in geographic terms, but also in discussions of cultural and 
virtual space, where a particular focus on the fluid, connecting aspects of new 
spatio/temporallocations is evident. This chapter extrapolates the implications of these 
(3) GlobalisatioflS. This acknowledges the multiple implications and effects of global processes: "For 
different social groups and different individuals are placed in very distinct ways in relations to these 
flows and interconnections. This point concerns not merely the issue of who moves and who 
doesn't ... it is also about power in relation to the flows and the movement. Different social groups 
have distinct relationships to this anyway-differentiated mobility: some are more in charge of it than 
others some initiate flows and movements, other don't; some are more on the receiving end of [it] 
than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it" (Massey 1993, p6l) So while the monopoly of 
international corporations and unfair trade laws are widely viewed as a negative consequence of 
globalisations, heightened cultural exchange and the positive impact of new technologies pull in a 
different direction and different people are affected in different ways by these developments. 
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features of contemporary experience for corporeality. 
The spatio-temporal effects of the processes of globalisation, new science and 
technology and new communications cause perceptual and conceptual~ social and 
material effects which are evident at a corporeal level. The heightened levels of cultural 
exchange, disruption of location, diminishing significance of national and other borders 
affect our sense of self in terms of our identity and sense of place. Mobile phone, 
texting, e-mail, the constant cultural exchange of inner-city language, are all evidence 
of new forms of communication and language via which these new ways of knowing 
are expressed and experienced. New medical scanning techniques allow ideas and 
experiences of bodily interiority and exteriority which are dramatically new. All these 
areas are both described and driven by a collapse of boundaries; the new topographies 
and languages that are developing in these areas are fundamental to how the body is 
newly described. 
These aspects of contemporary social and cultural life are defined by transformations in 
space, technology and language which are shown in the historical analysis to have been 
central to the transformation of systems of knowledge broadly and corporeal 
experience specifically. Most importantly, in this contemporary study, all aspects show 
a tendency to disrupt established boundaries and lead to a focus on the surface of the 
body as a site of change and exchange between interior and exterior worlds. A plethora 
of works on the skin in mainstream and academic disciplines testifies to this renewed 
preoccupation with the bodily surface (Connor 2003, Benthien 2002). 
One of the most apparent and significant alterations to contemporary spatial location is 
the diminishing significance of traditional geopolitical boundaries, particularly here in 
relation to subjective perceptions of individual, local and national location in the world. 
Heightened flows of cultural exchange permit collective, unregulated exposure to 
different ways of thinking and imagining our embodied selves so that formations of 
identity - "self', "other" and "community" - and the relations between these are, in the 
developed world, less determined. The heightened levels of cultural exchange amongst 
merchant traders permitted a new sense of identity; a rational thinking individual, and 
this was an essential and determining feature of the early Enlightenment. The intense 
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levels of cultural exchange that contemporary subjects experience through media, 
through the Internet and by living on the streets of cities, like those that the merchant 
traders encountered, facilitate a freedom permitted by knowledge of the diversity of 
other cultures and at the same time bring an increased awareness of the particularity of 
one's own cultural and physical location: "Hence one paradoxical consequence of the 
process of globalization, the awareness of the finitude and boundedness of the planet 
and humanity, is not to produce homogeneity but to familiarize us with greater 
diversity, the extensive range of local cultures" (Featherstone 1993, p169). Just as the 
traders in the Middle Ages were suddenly communicating in new ways with new 
people, so global communication is "greatly amplifying its diffusion by bringing more 
practices and more individuals within its pattern offonnation" (poster 1996, p191). 
The discoveries of the Enlightenment brought into crisis religious and philosophical 
assumptions about the place of man within God's universe; in the contemporary 
context the power of science and technology to alter our sense of location and also to 
supplement or change the physical body, in tenns of prosthetics, or genetics for 
example, forces questions about the role of humanity and the usefulness and relevance 
of the human body; corporeality is foregrounded. 
The possible spheres for communication that are available to those in the 
technologically developed world have become numerous: face to face, e-mail, 
telephone for example (4), which means on the one hand that identity is impacted by 
having to interact in more numerous ways, more varied formats and with potentially 
more disperse and numerous people and, on the other hand, means that the arena 
within which that identity can be expressed is broadened, that there is an increased 
capacity for communicating identity in multiple and various ways. These new 
interactions and communications contribute to shifts and multiplications in subjective 
identities while, at the same time, facilitating more complex and varied possibilities for 
expressions of identity. 
(4) Just using a telephone several modes of communication are available to suit the p~cular, . 
urgency, tone or intimacy of the call; distinctions between speaking on the phone, ~e~ng, lea"lng a 
voice mail message, leaving an answer-phone message are subtle but useful, there IS mcreased space 
for manipulation. 
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What then are the implications of these developments in communication for corporeal 
experience? The result is that in transformational periods the body becomes the 
primary point of reference, in tenns of spatial and temporal location and in terms of 
identity. When there is continual development and multiplicity in the exterior world, 
the significance of the body as a vantage point is increased, the body becomes crucial 
as a point of reference (5). As the anthropologist Henrietta Moore says: "Many people 
... , have occasions when they find it extremely difficult to conceive of themselves as 
rational, autonomous and unitary" (Moore 1994, p33). She argues that when 
everything around us is in flux, our constant is our physical being, our bodily existence: 
Within philosophical discourse, the question of what constitutes personal identity 
focuses on the question of what establishes the continuity or self-identity of the 
person over time ... In tenns of anthropological discourse it seems quite evident that 
the most important characteristic of the person over time, and the one which 
constitutes its identity, is the fact of human existence. (Moore 1994, p36). 
Expressing a non-unitary, non-rational identity is problematic if the world within which 
that identity exists is described in stable, unitary and rational terms. However, if the 
world is understood as changing and varied and our modes of communication allow 
multiplicity and fluidity in expression of identity then this conflict is resolved. Further, 
as Moore says, these factors lead to an increased emphasis on physicality, a 
revalidation of sensory experience in relation to knowing oneself in articulation with 
the world. 
Sadie Plant (Plant 1996) expands on the contribution of new communications to a 
refiguration of the sensory hierarchy. She argues that because these communications 
operate in a realm of multiple and varied connections, touch becomes the authoritative 
sense, the sense that is aligned with "knowing": 
If the media were once as divided as the senses with which they interact, their 
convergence and transition into hypermedia allows the senses to fuse and connect. 
Touch is the sense of multimedia, the immersive simulations of cyberspace, and the 
connections switches and links of all nets. Communication cannot be caught by the , 
gaze, but is always a matter of getting in touch, a question of contact, contagion, 
transmission, receptions and connectivity. If sight was the dominant and organizing 
(5) The current obsession with defining and redefining the home as a place where identity can be 
safely expressed is evident in the plethora of programmes on DIY and interior design on television. 
The home is understood as point of reference in anthropological works, in comparable tenns to the 
way the body is understood as a point of reference here, see Janet Carsten, Steve Hugh-Jones "About 
the Home" (Oxford, Blackwell, 1994). 
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sense of the patriarchal economy, tactility is McLuhan's 'integral' sense ... The 
medium is the message, and there is no 'possibility of distinguishing what is 
touching from what is touched' (plant, citing McLuhan and lrigarary 2000, p332). 
Plant's discussion of tactility focuses on the contact of communication networks which 
she understands as a development of feminine communication. This then is not a new 
approach - but a newly validated approach, one where subjects who were excluded 
from previous dominant structures of knowledge (see Chapter Three), especially 
classical science, are at home, can flourish. Plant argues that until very recently 
feminism has found itself up against the wall with every attempt made to escape 
patriarchal economy: "Even Jrigaray cannot imagine quite what such a transformation 
would involve" (Plant 2000, p327) yet unexpectedly, through the application of 
technology, an economy of connections, an arena has been opened up where women's 
identity can be expressed and is legitimate. It is argued here that other subjects who 
have been disempowered by Enlightenment discourse also enjoy a compatibility and 
are empowered by this new discourse, are at ease in interaction with this connective 
environment. 
After decades of ambivalence towards technology, many feminists are now finding a 
wealth of opportunities, spaces and lines of thought amidst the new complexities of 
the 'telecoms revolution'. The Internet promises women a network of lines on 
which to chatter, natter, work and play; virtuality brings a fluidity to identities 
which once had to be fixed; and multimedia provides a new tactile environment in 
which women artists can find their space. (plant 2000, p325). 
In postcolonial theories a corresponding idea can be found, where marginalized 
subjects, by standing at borders, possibly simultaneously at many borders, are theorised 
as occupying a powerful subjective position: 
Such diverse pleasures can be experienced, enjoyed even, because one transgresses, 
moves' out of one's place.' For many of us, that movement requires pushing against 
oppressive boundaries set by race, sex and class domination. Initially, then, it is a 
defiant political gesture ... Towards that revolutionary effort which seeks to create 
space where there is unlimited access to pleasure and power of knowing, where 
transformation is possible. (hooks' 1990, p145). 
For hooks and others (Soja 1996, Bhabha 1994) observing and theorising from the 
outside gives you a view, an edge, an angle, a powerful place to stand in relation to 
knowledge. These arguments are so important here because the connective models of 
technology are understood by Plant as definitive of emergent structures of knowledge, 
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for Plant the useful metaphor and model is that of cross-connections. In postcolonial 
theory, subjects who stand at the edge of dominant discourse or who cross between 
categories hold a powerful subjective position by challenging, stretching and confusing 
categorisation. For this project, where the metaphors and models of science and 
knowledge are understood to be crucial to the ways we define and understand 
corporeality, this model of connectivity brings the site of interest to the point of 
connection between the interior and exterior body, the surface - skin. 
The language ofdigitization is central to Plant's work "Zeros and Ones" (plant 1998), 
where "Digitization sets zero free to stand for nothing and make everything work. The 
ones and zeros of machine code are not patriarchal binaries or conterparts to each 
other: zero is not the other but the very possibility of all the ones." (plant 2000, p333) 
It is suggested here that the economy which Plant describes as invalidated by 
digitization is not only the patriarchal economy, this binary economy is the basis of 
Enlightenment discourse, so that digitzation escapes patriarchal economy but also 
escapes the broader economy of difference: light and dark, good and bad - these 
metaphors can be extended endlessly - inside and outside, self and other. In 
contemporary discourse all these oppositional definitions are ruined, the interest is in 
the exchange or connections between fluid categories. If this model is thought about 
in the context of corporeality, the site of connectivity and exchange is the border of the 
body. The bodily surface is the site of connection between the anatomical exterior and 
interior; skin becomes the focus of intense activity, material and symbolic. These 
theories further exemplify the dissolution of fixed, bounded space and expound the 
success of previously excluded subjects within these new cultural, social, and 
ontological arenas. It also reinforces the argument that a radical restructuring of our 
approach to knowing is occurring and re-establishes the interaction between 
formations of knowledge and scientific/technological models. 
Plant does not extend her discussion to the validity of touch in the corporeal sense, i. e. 
the physical body in touch with a material world. So the next progression in the 
argument for this project is to extend this theory and demonstrate that these shifts 
correlate directly with new experiences and meanings of corporeality and to show that 
these new freedoms of identity and communication, alongside a renewed emphasis on 
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tactility and imagination, have an impact upon the experience of the physical, material, 
sensory world. 
Mark Poster's work theoretically affirms this suggestion, arguing that virtual 
technologies have the potential to effect shifts in concepts of material embodiment (see 
Introduction )and revalidates imagination in a relationship with knowledge. He 
discusses indications of the legitimisation of an imaginative and playful element in the 
formation of identity, qualities which were invalidated by scientific discourse. 
The playful, imaginative element discussed by Poster in relation to electronic 
communications is evident in the new languages that are developing in interaction with 
new media, as he suggests, but are also revealed in the cross cultural influences of 
spoken language in the cities. These languages are distinctly different from previous 
languages - the metaphorical, playful elements of the language are overt and the 
constant process, evolution of language is transparent. These elements are not only 
not disguised, but desirable, are central to the appeal and relevance of these languages. 
Texting, e-mail, "deconstruction and electronic writing understand the volatility of 
written language, its instability and uncertain authorship. Both see language as 
effecting a destabilization of the subject, a dispersal of the individua~ a fracturing of 
the illusion of the self' (poster 1995, p72). In Poster's argument these developments 
can be understood in the context of the history of media, where subjectivity is 
formulated in direct correlation with contemporaneous media and modes of 
communication: 
Proponents of print culture, ... , link the gap in language to the subject as centred in 
reason ... Electronic culture permits a different interpretation of the gap. The 
tremendous extension of the space between speaker and listener in the mode of 
infonnation upsets the confinement of the gap to the self-identical subject. The 
combination of the enonnous distances with temporal immediacy produced by 
electronic communications both removes the speaker from the listener and brings 
them together. These opposing tendencies - opposite from the point of view of print 
culture - reconfigures the individual so drastically that the figure of the self, fixed in 
time and space, capable of exercising cognitive control over surrounding objects, 
may no longer be sustained. Language no longer represents a reality, no longer is a 
neutral tool to enhance the subjects instrumental rationality: language becomes or 
better reconfigures reality. (poster 1995, p60). 
Language never was a neutral tool, as explained in depth in Chapter Two, the 
exposure - celebration even - of this fact however, is an indication of a radical change 
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in the structuring of knowledge: significantly altering the relationship between truth 
and language. As the relationship between truth and vision is being disrupted, the 
relationship of truth with language has similarly become dispersed, multiple and 
complicated, allowing a freedom to play with words and syntax, legitimising the use of 
new words, giving voice to more people and disseminating the authority of language. 
Comparable developments are evident in visual media: television, broadcasting and 
web design, for example, where: 
'Their stories are becoming more and more idiosyncratic, interactive and 
individualistic, told in different forums to diverse audiences in different \vavs' This 
explosion of narrativity depends upon a technology that is unlike print and ~e the 
electronic media in the fust age: it is cheap, flexJ.ble, readily available, quick. (poster 
1996,pI95) 
The implications of the Web are astounding: film clips and voice readings maybe be 
included in 'texts' and 'authors' may indicate their links as 'texts'. In addition, other 
related technologies produce similar decentralizing effects. Such phenomena ... are 
transgressing the constraints of broadcast oligopolies. (poster 1996, p195). 
Poster says that this new narrative position is evident in the return to the 'little story' 
which via Lyotard he discusses as that "which validates difference, extols the 
'unpresentable' and escapes the overbearing logic of instrumentality that derives from 
the metanarrative of progress" (poster 1996, p195). This tum towards the small 
narrative is apparent all around us (in reality television, obsession with minor celebrity, 
chat rooms, message boards, Tracey Emin's art, Sam Taylor-Woods installation of 
David Beckham sleeping at the National Portrait Gallery, the continuous murmuring of 
incidental text and mobile conversations) and these small stories provide greater 
context by which to understand the particularity of our subjective cultural and material 
location, which is picked out variously in relation to these many and varied interactions 
and connections. This is an obvious departure from the metanarratives of 
Enlightenment discourse, away from large objective truths and towards small 
subjective narratives. 
Poster argues that notions of community and nation have always been dependent upon 
the imaginary, "In the case of the nation, generally regarded as the strongest group 
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identification in the modem period and thus perhaps the most 'real' community of this 
era, the role of the imaginary has been fundamental" (poster 1996, p192) So: 
Just as virtual communities are understood as having the attributes of 'rea!' 
communities, so 'real' communities can be seen to depend on the imaginary: what 
makes a community vital to its members is their treatment of the communications as 
meaningful and important. (poster 1996, p94) 
The difference then is not in the role of the imaginary in the formation of social identity 
but in the fact that the imaginary element is exposed - just as the metaphorical nature 
of language and knowledge is now exposed - the importance of the imaginary in our 
conception of the self and our relation to others is revealed. 
Over time, as technology has grown increasingly complex, and in particular with 
the development of information technology (which addresses itself overtly rather 
than covertly to symbolic exchange), the role of technology in mediating the flow of 
communication between bodies and selves has become more ubiquitous and more 
indispensable. (Stone 1995, p86). 
Certainly, in much postmodem theory it had been predicted that technology would 
devalue community and the body, causing atrophy and dislocation (Vrrilio 97). The 
work ofVirilio particularly but also Baudrillard (Baudrillard 98), in the 1980s and 90s, 
predicted physical inertia and break down of community brought about by 
detenninistic technologies. However, twenty years on the reality of the development 
of science and technology has not fulfilled these predictions: the development of 
robots, for example, has served rather to heighten interest in the intricacies of nature 
and the human body. The purpose of the building of Steve Grand's artificially 
intelligent baby orang-utan , the robot Lucy, was to find out how the human cortex 
operates, how people learn. The process of this has demonstrated what an enormous 
amount of soft and hardware is required to get Lucy to point at a banana, or stand up, 
or see dimly with one eye; the process has served not to supplant or render useless our 
physicality but rather to re-enchant both nature and the body. Another example would 
be the new "musclebots", robots 50 micrometres wide with legs powered by the 
muscle from a rat's heart, where the energy is generated not from electricity but 
organically from glucose (The Independent 26.2.04, p24). These examples of new 
technologies are based in the fusion of the natural with the technological, they are 
founded on a collapse of distinctions between organic and machine, nature and science, 
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it is in the interaction of these elements, (which in classical scientific discourse were 
considered not only to be distinct but to operate within a hierarchy of authority in 
relationship to truth), that developments like these thrive. These aspects of scientific 
and technological progress, as well as illuminating the collapse of disciplinary 
boundaries, support the argument that contemporary science is distinctly different to 
classical science. This is in itself another indication that a radically new approach to 
knowledge is occurring and that an important element of this is a heightened 
fascination and interaction with the intricacies of natural processes. 
In a change accordant with the refocus on corporeality in light of scientific and 
technological breakthroughs, the decreased significance of national borders has 
operated in certain ways to heighten our sense of physical location, our awareness of 
the particularity of our situated self. David Harvey asks: "why it might be that the 
elaboration of place-bound identities has become more rather than less important in a 
world of diminishing spatial barriers to exchange, movement and communication" 
(Harvey 1993, p4). Suggesting that, 
While the collapse of spatial barriers has undermined older material and territorial 
definitions of place, the very fact of that collapse ... Has put renewed emphasis upon the 
interrogation of metaphorical and psychological meanings which, in turn, give new 
material definitions of place by way of territorial behaviour. (Harvey 1993, p4). 
Rather than becoming lost in this fragmented, multiple world, the specificity of our 
spatial, temporal and cultural location falls sharply into relief against our knowledge of 
the diversity of global cultures and the immensity of unpopulated universal distances. 
The significance of the body (and to an extent home and locality) as a primary point of 
reference becomes crucial. 
The forces of globalisations are neither uniform or unidirectional, however, the 
underlying tendencies are largely defined by a compression of space and time (Harvey 
1995). Yet with regard to the explorations and new knowledge of deep space, the 
universal scale, there is a marked tension with global perspectives. Where global spatial 
distances effectively diminish, on a universal scale spatial distance is the challenge, the 
terrain is so vast and so unknown and both our significance (in that, so far as we know, 
we are the only life in the universe) and insignificance (in relation to the immense space 
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and time of the universe) are evident. We have only recently become aware of the 
expanding universe and of the immensity of universal distances, both spatial and 
temporal, and these phenomena operate in contradiction to global phenomena and 
perspectives. Globally, due especially to air travel and to the use of mobile phones, 
where, subject to getting a reception, we are never alone, terrestrial space becomes 
less and less of an issue. The material experience of distance and location and the sense 
of being a located person are accordingly altered, yet explorations into space show a 
vast, expanding universe, where any form of cartography must take account of time as 
well as space - points are relational to space and time, they are moving. The old two 
dimensional cartographic methods are no longer adequate, like ideas of mapping in 
theories of virtual technology, the dimension of time must be factored in in order to 
take account of the transient nature of location. The spatio-temporallocation of the 
body is again essential as a reference point. The relationship between the particular 
and the universal is taken away from oppositional discourse in this articulation, the 
particular and the universal are interactive and definitive of each other. 
As expanded in Chapter Four, the major departure from a determinable mechanistic 
world came with the implications of Einstein' s theory of relativity, 
Our vision of nature is undergoing a radical change towards the multiple, the 
temporal and the complex. For a long time a mechanistic world view dominated 
Western Science. In this view the world appeared as a vast automaton. We now 
understand that we live in a pluralistic world. Today we see everywhere the role of 
irreversible processes, of fluctuations, science is rediscovering time. (Prigogine and 
Stengers 1984, p2l8, my emphasis). 
This sea change in the way the world is approached has facilitated all the theories 
discussed above. Quantum physics, which underpins dominant contemporary scientific 
explanations for the operations of the universe and us as part of that, cannot be visually 
proven or demonstrated, the comprehension of these theories, the acceptance of them 
as legitimate, requires an imaginative leap. Although the theories of classical science 
often also depend on deductive rather than visual proof (the forces of gravity can not 
be seen), it is argued here that at the very large and very small scales with which 
contemporary science is concerned, things operates in ways differently to those on our 
scale. Everyday experience and deduction would not lead us to the conclusions of 
contemporary science. This is very important in relation to the project as a whole 
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where it is suggested that the role of the imaginary plays a newly validated role in our 
understanding of the world. In the conclusion a qualitative and textual analysis of the 
science and process ofNMRI is proposed. This is an example of a science, a 
technology and a topography that is based on the science of quantum physics which 
requires an imaginative leap in order to be believed. This leap manifests itself as a real 
time image of the functioning body, an image that can reveal the functioning brain, 
emotion and reaso~ or an image showing the activity of the heart or vascular system, 
before your very eyes. Siting reality in relation to all of this is complex, it is new and 
confusing, requiring the conjunction of imagination (the conceptual) and experience to 
be accepted as reality. 
As NMRI is to be examined later as an example of a topography where science and the 
body, imagination, experience and reality meet, so cartography and the printing press 
are examined in the following chapters as especially significant. It is in these 
technological models and applications that the three key factors, which it is suggested 
are central to a transformation to our systems of knowledge, space, language and 
technology, coincide with each other and with the body. These technologies were 
spatially described and allowed a new use of language and new forms of 
communication and as such they were crucial, definitive and explanatory elements of 
Enlightenment discourse, as well as being essential to the development of Classical 
Science. This is why it is so important to examine new technologies of communication 
and new forms of mapping in the contemporary context; the language and models of 
these are likely, given what is known from the historical analysis, to be definitive of 
new concepts for understanding the body. The common distinguishing factors of 
contemporary topographies, are: spatio-temporallocation, fluidity and connectivity. 
So, in relation to both virtual, quantum and deep space, contemporary topographies 
which use new cartographic models to take account of temporal as well as spatial 
points of location and require models that illustrate the complex and varied 
connections between places, are inherent to understanding bodily location. One of the 
primary purposes of this project is to explore the ways in which such topographies 
relate to the way we are coming to understand, define and experience corporeal 
location. 
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In the discipline of cyberculture an approach to theory and to style can be found in 
which many of these aspects fuse. In "The Cybercultures reader" (Bell, 2000), it is 
stated that the "mission" of the book: 
Is to attempt to understand the ways which cyberspace as a cultural phenomenon is 
currently being experienced and imagined ... we need to consider the place of 
imagination and representation, cultural use and value, and focus our attention most 
squarely on human interactions with (and within) these emerging cybercultural 
formations. (Bell 2000, pI, my emphasis). 
As an approach this is interesting because of the emphasis on imagination and 
experience. As our private space diminishes and the world gets busier, the imagination 
opens up as a realm, a realm freed up by new technologies and new multiplications of 
identity. The language of cyberspace explores explicitly the collapse of boundaries, 
this is its core. The collapse between nature, machine, human is its central theme, not 
just in terms of words - metaphor, jargon and literary style, (this discourse has found 
the freedom to play with language, to be creative rather than traditionally academic 
and uses this as an explanatory tool) but also as a partial explanation of how these 
technologies affect subjective identity and as an indication of the tendencies of new 
language. 
"Thinking about it cartographically or schematically, we can describe this hardware as 
a web, a network, a decentralized system - we can use the term rhizomatic to describe 
its infinite, uncentred, root-like structure." (Bell 2000, p2) this is also how the book is 
meant to be read, approached. This "infinite, uncentred, root-like structure" needs to 
be thought of then in relation to bodily location - the way we locate our identity in 
relation to a fluid, multiple world where location is uncentred and infinite. Although, 
as argued, bodily location becomes heightened in significance as the point of reference 
in a moving changing world, that is absolutely not to say that bodily location is a fixed 
point amongst change: it is changing and fluid in itself This project is concerned with 
articulating these phenomena, these ontologically new phenomena, in relation to 
sensory expenence. 
The language of cyborg theory is usefuL its primary tools are the metaphors of the 
interface, connectivity, and digitization, all the most useful models of contemporary 
discourses for the body. The work of Donna Haraway (Haraway 1985, 1988) has 
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been very important here, Haraway's collapse of boundaries between nature and 
machine or organic and technological preceded much of this theory, and also scientific 
practice: like Lucy the robot and "microbots". Her ironic manifesto also claimed that 
by becoming cyborgs we can escape history and so be free from patriarchy. This 
project diverges from Haraway's at this point: here it is argued that an escape from 
history even if possible is not desirable. When so much emphasis is on history now, 
embodiment now, as it happens, our past personal history is vital as reference. To pick 
up Ferguson's point made in chapter Four where she says that the only possible 
vantage point we have for looking at the universe is into the past, so, when the future 
is multiple and unpredictable, when there is little stability in the present from which to 
take a standpoint, history would seem to be vital as a tool and as an anchor. 
These works explore the way in which bodies are experienced and imagined in 
cyberspace, they do not ask how these interactions affect the corporeal body, or how 
the experience of corporeality might be refigured in real space. It is evident however, 
that the discourse and models of this work is rich ground for metaphors for the 
corporeal body: the model of interconnections and of the interface and also 
digitization all speak a language explanatory of the body and its interactions. Virtual 
space is an imaginary realm and as Poster says: "Virtual and real communities mirror 
each other in chiasmic juxtaposition" (poster 1996, p 194). As our personal space is 
restricted and reduced (through data bases, CCTV, information on our hard drive etc.) 
an imaginary world correspondingly opens up. 
It is clear then that cybory theory, feminist theory, postcolonial theory - all are 
operating in the same environment - exploring the collapse of boundaries, fluid identity 
in interaction with spatio-temporal theories of location. Evidence for the tendencies 
this project is concerned with are central to global processes, technological processes, 
cultural interaction, artistic production, all of which are interested in the interaction 
between categories, the collapse of distinctions, the creativity this releases: these 
tendencies are not in dispute. What this project aims to do is to identify the way these 
new experiences and understandings of our world might facilitate new explanations for 
corporeality: the activity between the interior and exterior worlds which is manifest in 
our physicality. 
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So, on material, conceptual and perceptual, levels, new interactions with space, 
language and technology are refiguring corporeality and the evidence for the validity of 
the research questions is demonstrated. A collapse of boundaries, and the centrality of 
spatio-temporallocation, fluidity and connectivity are the common significant themes 
of new developments in space, language and technology. This is the factor to be 
discussed in relationship with the body in the final chapter, where it is demonstrated 
that imagination, corporeal experience and tactility are newly configured in relation to 
knowledge and an area for qualitative analysis of these phenomena is proposed. 
Next is the historical analysis which contextualises the questions and develops the 
significance and complexity of the interactions of space and language and technology 
in defining knowledge and corporeal knowledge. The broadness and depth of the 
following contextualisation is important as a justification of the methodological 
approach, where, given the acknowledged subjectivity of the analysis, the richer the 
contextualisation the stronger the evidence (Harding 1987). 
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CHAPTER TWO. 
THE BODY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION. 
It is argued that while the earlier modem period was concerned with categorizing 
knowledge and the marking of boundaries, geographically, medically, philosophically 
and metaphorically, what is significantly new about contemporary developments is that 
new knowledge, technologies, and cultural expressions succeed by the blurring of 
distinctions and the disruption of demarcations of difference. Theories of subjectivity 
have been preoccupied with these issues for at least twenty years. This project will 
explore the possibility that disturbances to concepts of exteriority and interiority and 
new metaphors and models for expression might transform the experience of the 
physical body in the physical world. It will be argued that that a new way of knowing 
the world will permit new parameters within which to experience corporeality. 
So, this chapter examines concepts of the self and body in a direct relationship with 
emergent approaches to knowledge, beginning in the early modem era and continuing 
through to the scientisation of knowledge. This will serve three primary aims, to offer 
a historical contextualisation of contemporary developments; to point out strong 
commonalities between the two periods, which will support the suggestion that we 
have also entered a transformational era; and by doing so, to identify that which is 
significantly different about current processes for development in the last chapter. 
Of particular interest here, because mapping can also be thought of as a way of 
locating the subject (and it is argued in the first and last chapters that the contemporary 
subject is mapped very differently to the Enlightenment individual), is the history and 
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language of cartography - both of the external world by the colonialists, and the 
mapping of the interior world by the anatomists. The ensuing scientific revolution 
brought about classification and categorisation of the physical body and the physical 
environment, and in this process a separation of the body from nature and from God 
was completed. A critical deconstruction of these processes is necessary in order to 
reach a deeper understanding, indeed many of the texts used are deconstructionist in 
approach. However, the motivation here is not to dismiss the discoveries and 
transformations of the period, rather it is to trace the process of alterations in ways of 
understanding the body in a relationship to its environment. This is in order to work 
towards an understanding of the articulation between changing concepts of space and 
time and changing concepts of the body. 
In the current period of technological and information revolution the body has come, in 
a variety of ways, and often paradoxically, to occupy a position at the forefront of 
transformations. This has had the effect on the one hand of diminishing the 
significance of the corporeal body because there is the potential, with the aid of 
computer technology and medical technology, of enabling and enhancing the body 
beyond given physical capabilities (1). 
On the other hand, such technologies intensify the significance of the body because, as 
its fragility and limits are exposed, this fragile physicality is simultaneously accented as 
the vital part of the body/machine fusion. So that, for example, representations in film 
and fiction of the cyborg (a hybrid of machine and body) (2), rather than substituting 
(1) Examples of enhancement of the body by technology range from spectacles, hearing aids and pace 
makers to advanced prosthetic limbs, computerised voice boxes or goggles which allow the blind to 
discern basic shapes. Virtual technologies, which are still in their infancy, allow the participant to 
enter a world where the limitations of corporeal existence are lifted, "one can fly or go through walls 
since the material constraints of earth need not apply" Mark Poster "Postmodem virtualites". 
Futurenatural eds Robertson, Mash et. aI. (London, New York, Routledge 1996) p189. Players of 
computer games are used to experiencing such phenomenon on a far more removed level. 
(2) Donna Haraway says a cyborg is: "a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a 
creature of social reality as well as fiction." 'A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and 
Socialist Feminism in the 1980s.' (SOCialist Review No. 80:65-106 Vol. 15, No 2. March April 1985) 
Vivian Sobchack, who has an artificial leg, defines both herself and Stephen Hawking, who uses a 
voice box, as cyborgs or "techno-bodies" in "Beating the Meat/Surviving the Text, or How to Get Out 
of this Century Alive" in Cyberspace/CyberbodiesiCyberpunk ed. Mike Featherstone and Roger 
Burrows (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, Sage 1995). 
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the ordinary human body for a mechanically, technologically advanced version, often 
serve to affirm the corporeal, "Popular culture has appropriated the scientific project; 
but instead of effacing the human body, these texts intensify corporeality in their 
representations of cyborgs" (Springer 1991, p304). By becoming aware of possibilities 
extra to corporeality, the boundaries of corporeality are sharpened and can be focused 
on. In these ways the body stands on the front-line of technological developments and, 
in terms of computer technology, is placed at the interface, both physically and 
virtually, of the virtual (3) and the corporeal worlds. 
The position in which the body is now sited; at the interface of spatial transformations 
and the place it occupied in the Enlightenment - looking outwards towards new worlds 
and inward into an unfathomable body, a medium between discoveries of the exterior 
and interior world, at the core of religious and philosophical upheaval, are not 
dissimilar - both are revolutionary sites. The key argument of this chapter is, that in 
periods of spatial and temporal revolution, the body is foregrounded as the site of 
cultural activity and that in the process of such revolution the body itself is also 
revolutionized. 
Rapidity of communication and dissemination of information, facilitated by technology, 
exponentially quickens the rate at which new cultural developments are assimilated 
into the general milieu. In the slower development of Enlightenment thinking, 
comparable phenomenon can be seen as essential factors in the formation of new ways 
of thinking the self, individually and collectively, these being: the influences of cross-
cultural exchange, which demanded new modes of communication and broadened 
horizons, and the advent of print capitalism which disseminated new ideas and enabled 
a new sense of national collective identity (Anderson 1991). 
(3) Mark Poster defines virtual space as "a computer generated 'place'" (poster 1996, 189). Just as 
Haraway defines the cyborg as being of "social reality as well as fiction" above, virtual space can be 
used as an extension of, or alternative location for, social reality but also allows and encourages an 
imaginary element, unrestricted by terrestrial spatial and temporal location and identity: ",,:irtual 
realities are fanciful imaginings that, in their difference from real reality, evoke play and discovery, 
instituting a new level of imagination" (poster 1996, pI89). 
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The profusion of spatial language, both actual and metaphorical, immediately reveals 
itself as common to both periods, which at first makes the comparisons appear quite 
direct and simple in their linearity. In fact, the reason the periods connect so tightly is 
because the connections are so multiple, complex and entwined. In part, this is 
because the language of discovery, born in the Enlightenment, has influenced the 
language of and approach to subsequent discoveries. So, as the discoveries of the 
Americas effected actual spatial revolutio~ and the subsequent explorations into 
anatomy were conceived of within the same spatial language (a language of 
demarcation and boundaries of defence) so these particular ways of describing space 
were forming intluences in the categorisation of science. The density of spatial 
metaphorical connections between the two eras presents a need to pull away the layers 
of meaning of language to attempt to gauge the extent to which the same metaphors 
are being employed for different meanings and to what extent similar transfonnations 
are actually being experienced. As Nancy Leys Stepan says: "We need a critical 
theory of metaphor in science in order to expose the metaphors by which we learn to 
view the world scientifically, not because metaphors are necessarily 'wrong' but 
because they are so powerful" (Stepan 1996, pI33). The centrality of metaphor to 
systems of knowledge is examined in depth in the next chapter. 
This issue has been confronted by geographers, where distinctions are made between 
"real" and "metaphorical" space, or "geographic space" and "cultural space" (Rose 
1993, p58). Such definitions are required for clarity of meaning, yet there is also a 
move amongst theorists toward a "third space". "Third space" defies the dualistic 
nature of distinctions such as material or metaphoric and recognizes that space cuts 
across many spheres of experience simultaneously and therefore is not best understood 
by contained definitions. Contemporary spatial theorists, notably Linda McDowell, are 
workina in this area and similar ideas can be found in the work of Henri Lefebvre. He o 
"opens the way to a trialectics of spatiality, always insisting that each mode of thinking 
about space, each 'field' of human spatiality - the physical, the mental, the social - be 
seen as simultaneously real and imagined, concrete and abstract, material and 
metaphorical" (Soja 1996, p64-65). These ideas will be examined elsewhere, here 
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attention is drawn to the problematics of defining and talking about space and to 
acknowledge that spatial understandings and meanings are not fixed. 
The period of Enlightenment holds a key to understanding contemporary systems of 
knowledge and to our language as intrinsic to this knowledge; the development of the 
two cannot be separated for it is by their interaction that a core of integrated meaning 
has been built. The language and discourse of the Enlightenment was fundamentally 
built on the concept of light as knowledge, opposed to dark as the unknown, a 
dichotomous and elitist discourse which, in order to move away from, recent theon' 
has had to try and take apart. Unpicking the language from the science can only be 
done on a surface level as they are constitutive of each other and because this 
discourse and language have become our discourse and language, we cannot take a 
view from nowhere (Harding 1987). In this sense a history of the body is as much 
about language as it is about the physical. 
Just as the Enlightenment was an epoch, the beginning of a new era in knowledge, so 
we now stand at the emergence of an information and technological revolution. Luce 
Irigaray has argued that "A change of epoch requires a mutation in perception of 
space-time, the inhabitation of place and of the envelopes of identity" (cited Whitford 
1991, pISS). This chapter will trace the form or pattern of some of these mutations. 
Space and time are interactive and difficult to talk about in isolation so while changes 
in temporality will be raised here the focus is the effects of transformations in space 
upon the body: the interstices of space and time will be thematic to other sections. 
Frederic Jameson is one among many cultural critics to declare time as defunct, 
postmodernism is "a scene in which the matrix of space has abolished categories of 
time" (cited Kirby 1996, p49) and in the seventeenth century Jonathan Sawday writes 
that "space not merely challenged the supremacy of ehronos, but revealed possibilities 
hitherto undreamed of' (Sawday 1995, p91). However, a broad chronology will be 
used as a framework here: looking firstly at early colonization and then at anatomical 
discoveries, inherently spatial projects that both revealed new spatial models and 
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demanded some sort of mastery or control of space. In doing so an attempt will be 
made to trace the refiguration of the body in its articulation with spatial 
transformation. The next chapter will follow on to look at the far reaching effects that 
classification and standardization of scientific discourse had upon language and 
knowledge, and begin to explore changing concepts of time. 
2.2 DISCOVERING AND MAPPING THE NEW WORLD. 
A group of people living on a few acres of land will set up boundaries between their 
land and its immediate surroundings and the territory beyond, which they call 'the 
land of the barbarians' ... To a certain extent modern and primitive societies seem 
thus to derive a sense of their identities negatively ... Yet often the sense in which 
someone feels himself to be not-foreign is based on a very unrigorous idea of what is 
'out there', beyond one's own territory. All kinds of suppositions, associations, and 
fictions appear to crowd the unfamiliar space outside one's own. (Said 1978, p5~). 
The territorial human conditio~ perceptively described here by Edward Said, explains 
the fear of unknown territory and the strategies by which people cope with this fear: 
marking off a known safe area, effectively claiming it, and, in so doing, establishing a 
distinction from the unkno~ boundless, outside area which is named as dangerous. 
Although international trading systems can be traced back as early as 2500 BC (4) and 
DavidHarvey states that the re-discovery of the Ptolemaic map in Florence in the 15th 
Century was "a fundamental breakthrough in the construction of geographical 
knowledge of the world as a single global entity" (Holton 1998, p34), Columbus's 
discovery of the Bahamas in 1492 marks the beginning of modern Western man's 
(4) Richard Holton argues in Globalization and the Nation State (Macmillan Press Ltd, Hampshire, 
London, 1998) that there is evidence of world trade from as early as 2500BC. In terms of economic 
trade "Janet Abu-Lughood (1989) ... discerns the existence of a world-economy based on long distance 
trade between Europe and Asia, organized through a chain of trading cities from Bruges to Venice, 
via Cairo and Baghdad, to Samarkand and Canton, as early as the 13th Century" and "Andre Gundar 
Frank (1990), ... speaks of 5000 years of 'world system history, taking the analysis back to 2500BC 
and before ... These include trade but also involve cross-cultural contact through conquest and through 
the diffusion of cultural ideas and practices." Holton identifies the recent global period as significant 
in its sustainability and beginning with the "consolidation and expansion of Western Capitalism from 
the 16th Century onwards" (p 26) but stresses that a "forseshortened sense of time horizons ine\1tably 
gives pride of place to the Western World" (p42). 
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journey into the outside dangerous world and was a crucial trigger for Enlightenment 
thinking. The defensive fear described by Said underpins much of the response or 
treatment of "new" lands and people. The "ours" and "theirs" philosophy is one of 
othering upon which the Colonialist project is built; a divisive, defensive mechanism. 
Said describes Orientalism as an appropriation by the West of that which is not 
Western as Eastern. This is a discourse resonant with all discourses that were born out 
of the Enlightenment in that it is based on creating an other in relation to the knowing 
subject where the knowing subject is Western man. This fear that Said identifies goes 
some way toward explaining the deep significance that the map held in the processes of 
these discoveries and the power that cartography held as a method, a language. 
However, although the "universal" strategy that Said refers to is the basis of the 
approach that the explorers had to these "barbarian" lands, the attitude of conquest 
and possession can not be comfortably explained away as a universal human strategy. 
The strategy of domination and ownership is something more than making safe a home 
and the inequity of this strategy is intensified by the exclusivity of the grouping of the 
explorers. The mechanism of demarcating boundaries as a means of defining the 
known and containing the unknown became the basis for charting progress through 
new territories. The motivation was to forge onwards, to claim not just more land but 
more knowledge, under the umbrella of Western progress. 
The significance of the map in this domination is that it became a strategic tool of 
power, the map was proof of ownership, a claim to conquering the unknown, and the 
fact that it was white men making the maps came along with other strategies of white 
male dominance to place them as masters of language and knowledge. "As an 
exemplary icon of imperial 'truth', the map like the compass and the mirror, is what 
Hulme aptly call a 'magic technology', a potent fetish helping colonials negotiate the 
perils of margin and thresholds in a world of terrifying ambiguities" (McClintock 1995, 
p28), so that "Map-making became the servant of colonial plunder" (McClintock 1995, 
p27). 
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The enormity of the colonialist project and the fear that this project demanded should 
not be underestimated; sailing into the unknown is, from a contemporary perspective, 
hard to invoke, perhaps an astronaut might have some insight, for "(t)he environment 
that the explorers experienced may have had little to do with the fixed space that we 
are accustomed to occupying now" (Kirby 1996, p48). Indeed, prior to the nineteenth 
century and precise calculations for longitude, the mapping, understanding, and so 
experiencing, of space was from an entirely different perspective: 
When one realizes that in the beginning the best that navigators could do to measure 
speed was to throw an object overboard from the bow and see how long it took to 
float past the stem: that for want of suitable timers, seamen had to rely on some 
subjective verbal standard - the time say of an Ave Maria ... then one can well 
understand that such calculations were often wildly inaccurate. (Landes 2000, 
p1l2-113). 
So, although the map was a method by which to contain fearfUl areas, until after the 
invention of the chronometer in 1761, these maps were as much symbolic as actual 
tools of domination, for they betrayed a high level of inaccuracy. The precise mapping 
of space made possible by John Harrison's chronometer was entirely dependent upon 
the accurate measurement of time which was clearly understood as a constant, 
exemplary of the order of the universe (the measurement of time being one offew 
areas in which consistent progress was made in the middle ages). (Landes 2000) Until 
methods could be found to bring space under the same control, i.e. confidently 
measured and predicted, the map served as an interim emblem of spatial conquest. 
The pernicious effects of longitude were multiplied by the consequences for 
cartography. The map after all, was the primary medium for the transmission of 
information and experience in matters of navigation - just as the book was in other 
areas of knowledge. In the international contest for access to the riches of the 
Indies, maps were money, and secret agents of aspiring powers paid gold for copies 
of the carefully guarded Portuguese pacirons. Bad measurements made bad maps, 
though, and many a ship spent precious days searching for land that showed only on 
paper. Cartographers had a dearth of accurate information and a plethora of guesses 
to go by, so that even contemporaneous maps differed in detail (Landes 2000, 
p1l4). 
After the accurate measurement of longitude however "the entire planet's curved 
surface had been subjected to a geometrical grid which squared off empty seas and 
unexplored regions in measured boxes. The task of, as it were, 'filling in' the boxes 
was to be accomplished by explorers, surveyors, and military forces. " (Anderson 1991, 
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pI73). By using the measurement of time, the spatial surface of the earth was brought 
under measured control, was mastered, this cartographic confidence meant that surface 
areas were quantifiable before exploration. In this sense the mapping grid predicts or 
precedes the territory, rather than the other way round. Cartography had found a 
system of order for surface space that, as expected, appeared to reflect, and was bound 
to, the order of time. 
A more recent example of the strategic power of the map can be found by looking at 
Siam, to whom modem cartography and print capitalism came in the late nineteenth 
century. Benedict Anderson, reliant on the thesis of Thongchai Wmichakul, "Siam 
mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of Siam" (ph.D. Thesis, University of Sydney, 
1988), looks at the convergence of the map with census taking and with print 
capitalism in the formation of a national identity. Although in this case the map was to 
become a tool of resistance against colonization, it is a case worth recounting as it 
illustrates the influence of the map both in the structuring of identity and as a strategic 
political tool. 
Prior to the accession of Ram a IV to the throne in 1851, Siam was not conceived of as 
having a form or shape enclosed by fixed boundaries. The British were moving into 
Siam from Lower Burma and although boundary stones were placed "discontinuously 
at strategic mountain passes and fords ... They were understood horizontally, at eye 
level, as extension points of royal power". Until this time, 
only two types of map existed in Siam .... One was what could be called a 
"cosmograph," a formal symbolic representation of the Three Worlds of traditional 
Buddhist cosmology ... The second type, wholly profane, consisted of diagrammatic 
guides for military campaigns and coastal shipping .... Their main features were 
written-in notes on marching and sailing times, required because the mapmakers 
had no technical conception of scale ... Thongchai points out that these guide maps, 
always local, were never situated in a larger, stable geographic context, and that the 
bird's-eye view convention of modern maps was wholly foreign to them. Neither 
type of map marked borders. (Anderson 1991, p171-172). 
Anderson states that print capitalism was flourishing by the 1870s, with the first 
printed geography by W.G. Johnson being published around 1900 and "Thongchai 
notes that the vectoral convergence of print-capitalism with the new conception of 
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spatial reality presented by these maps had an immediate impact on the vocabulary of 
Thai politics" (Anderson 1991, pI73). For the first time the concept of, and word for, 
"country" was introduced and rapidly replaced the sacred domains that had previously 
made sense of place. While the early colonizers used cartography as a tool for 
possession of new territories, in Siam the map was required as a tool by which to 
describe what was already theirs and so to resist colonization. 
In terms of most communication theories and common sense, a map is a scientific 
abstraction of reality. A map merely represents something which already exists 
objectively 'there'. In the history I have described, this relationship was reversed. 
A map anticipated spatial reality, not vice versa. In other words, a map was a model 
for, rather than a model of, what it purported to represent.. It had become a real 
instrument to concretize projections on the earth's surface. A map was now 
necessary for the new administrative mechanisms and for the troops to back up their 
claims ... The discourse of mapping was the paradigm which both administrative and 
military operations worked within and served. (Thongchai 'Siam Mapped' in 
Anderson 1991, p173-174). 
In a neat reversal of the way in which colonizers had used the map as a claim to 
ownership, the advent of a bounded form for their country enabled Siam to both name 
what was theirs in a language shared by potential colonizers and to generate a national 
identity with which to resist colonial forces. The map became a powerful symbol of 
belonging just as it had also been used by other regimes as a symbol of conquest. This 
is how Anderson describes the development of the "map-as-Iogo": 
Its origins were reasonably innocent - the practice of the imperial states of coloring 
their colonies on maps with an imperial dye. In London's imperial maps, British 
colonies were usually pink-red, French purple-blue, Dutch yellow-brown, and so on. 
Dyed this way, each colony appeared like a detachable piece of a jigsaw puzzle. As 
this "jigsaw" effect became normal, each 'piece' could be wholly detached from its 
geographic context. In its final form all explanatory glosses could be summarily 
removed: lines of longitude and latitude, place names, signs for rivers, seas, and 
mountains, neighbours. Pure sign, no longer compass to the world. In this shape, 
the map entered an infinitely reproducible series, available for transfer to posters, 
official seals, letterheads, magazine and textbook covers, tablecloths and hotel walls. 
Instantly recognizable, everywhere visible, the logo-map penetrated deep into the 
popular imagination, fonning a poweIful emblem for the anticolonial nationalism 
beingbom. (Anderson 1991, p175, original emphasis). 
The figurative importance of the map as a representation of conquered territory is 
exemplified here and it is reasonable, it is suggested here, to assert that the map held 
an equally persuasive role as an emblem of power in the colonization of territory as it 
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has also done as a language and a symbol by which to resist colonization in the above 
case. 
The language of cartography set a precedent, for as the anatomists began to dissect the 
human body they too imagined this as a voyage, although this time a voyage inwards 
and they took the language of colonization with them. Consequently the motivations of 
the explorers and the language that expressed these motivations, were transposed onto 
the body and a cartography of the body was initiated. For this reason the language 
that was employed in describing the newly "discovered" world, is crucial in coming to 
an understanding of the way the anatomical body was thought about and described in 
the earliest anatomical explorations. 
Faced with the unknown, the familiar metaphor that the explorers took from their 
established knowledge, the known experience that could be likened to this new 
experience, was the unknowable nature, the otherness of woman. So as the land was 
colonized and maps were made of the "captured" land, lines were drawn, borders were 
established and at these borders the language of the feminine was employed to describe 
the threshold and those areas as yet unknown, not yet made safe: 
As European men crossed the dangerous thresholds of their known worlds, they 
ritualistically feminised borders and boundaries. Female figures were planted like 
fetishes at the ambiguous borders contact, at the border and orifices of the contest 
zone... In myriad ways, women served as mediating and threshold figures by means 
of which men oriented themselves in space, as agents of power and agents of 
knowledge. (McClintock 1995, p24). 
Although the language of the feminine is apparent in the demarcation of the unknown, 
the other was not only feminine, the other was a complex amalgam of metaphors for 
that which was unsafe or strange. Dark, the most basic enlightenment metaphor for 
that which is not light, where light is knowledge, also speaks of racial difference, so 
that the "trope of the dark continent" for example merges: 
Two unknowabilities, racial difference and sexual difference ... Othemess, whether 
sexual or racial, is usually articulated as a problem of the limits of knowledge and 
hence of visibility, recognition, differentiation ... The trope, however, reduces and 
oversimplifies the extremely complex relations between racial and sexual difference 
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articulated by the colonialist enterprise" (Mary Ann Doane, 1991, quoted in 
Lindenmeyer 1999, p56). 
It is important also to recognize that the metaphor itself did not create the position of 
other. As Renee Heller argues: "The basic values of a culture are usually compatible 
with the metaphorical structure of the fundamental concepts in the culture, so '[n Jot 
surprisingly, the social groups represented metaphorically as "other" and "inferior" in 
Western Culture were socially disenfranchised in a variety of ways. '" (Heller 1996, p 72 
quoting Stepan 1986, p265) Yet the dependency of a new language of knowledge 
upon such metaphor certainly served to compound the position of the disenfranchised 
and to exclude them from active participation in, or contribution to, emerging ways of 
knowing the world. Equally, ways of knowing the world from the position of other 
were discredited. 
It was necessary to make safe, to shore up the individual, precisely because man's 
place in the universe was made so unstable by the discoveries of previously unknown 
inner and outer worlds. Map making was one of the ways in which the dangers were 
limited by containing within maps the discovered, the conquered, and describing the 
feared and desired unknown as dark or female. So, as the Enlightenment individual 
began to establish himself, it was on the basis of exclusion, so that women and those 
from outside Europe were excluded from the position of subjectivity. The map was 
one of the methods by which the white male subject placed himself in the central 
position of holder of knowledge. 
The similarity of mapped space and the mapping subject stems from the way the 
boundary between them is patterned as a constant barricade enforcing the difference 
between the two sites: part of the function of mapping is to ensure that the relationship 
between the knower and the known remains unidirectional. (Kirby 1996, pS.t). 
Kathleen Kirby argues that the new subject emerging in the Enlightenment did so in 
articulation with new emergent concepts of space, so that the subject and space 
established their meanings in a mutual dependency. A new subjectivity is only possible 
in operation with spatial changes. She says that: 
the development of the Enlightenment individualism was ... Inextricably tied to a 
specific concept of space and the technologies invented for dealing with space ... The 
Cartesian subject, the Enlightenment individual, the autonomous ego of 
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psychoanalysis: all appear to be reducible to this same graphic schema. The 
'individual' expresses a coherent, consistent, rational space paired with a consistent, 
stable, organized environment. Cartography .. .is both an expression of the new form 
of subjectivity, and a technology allowing (or causing) the new subjectivity to 
coalesce. (Kirby 1996, p45). 
This presents the possibility that current spatial transformations will develop in 
coexistence with transformations in subjectivity: "The new styles of space forming the 
foundation of postmodemism may offer precisely the material for building a new kind 
of subjectivity, one that will not leave non-dominant subjects at the theoretical and 
political margins" (Kirby 1996, p46). Current theory finds its interests in the margins, 
the interface, as the area of most intense poilitical-cultural activity, the exchange and 
change, while the Enlightenment was concerned with marking off solid areas of 
knowledge, "truth". So the subject formed within these stable, consistent spaces, is 
not a subject that will survive in the fluctuating, in-between regions of postmodem 
space. While cartography is concerned with the boundary as defining the claimed and 
known, the boundary is not a point of interaction but rather a point of defence. Kirby 
claims that this is an "interface", "mediating the relationship between space and the 
subject and constructing each in its own particularly ossified way" (Kirby 1996, p47), 
whereas today's is a site of activity and potential development and this site is 
constantly shifting. 
There are, at the same time, ways in which the boundaries at which the colonialists 
stood can be likened to the ways that boundaries are envisaged in contemporary 
theory. As the boundary marked the limit of discovery, it would be developed and 
extended as more land was claimed, the boundary would be moved as more of what 
had been unknown was assimilated into the known. McClintock argues that this 
liminal status which the colonialists held was a threshold position, a position of 
possible danger, in much the same terms that cultural boundaries are described today. 
"There on the margins between known and unknown, the male conquistadors, 
explorers and sailors became creatures of transition and threshold" (McClintock 1995, 
p24-2S). In this sense they occupied a privileged position, they physically stood at the 
point of transition which, metaphorically, cultural theorists attempt to stand at today 
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and, perhaps paradoxically, is the place at which those not accounted for by dominant 
subjectivities find themselves today: at the margins. 
From this place, in retrospect, the explorers can be seen to have held a position of 
enormous influence. The significant difference between these marginal figures and 
those that stand at the metaphorical margins today, is that these were an exclusive 
group in a position of power, unlike the most ostracized, least powerful groups who 
occupy marginal positions in contemporary society. From a theoretical angle these 
marginal groups, by challenging dominant discourse, have the power to alter cultural 
activity, the power to change meanings: a metaphorical rather than actual power, just 
as they stand at a metaphorical rather than actual border. 
The slightly later period of classification and measurement, after Descartes, is when 
our modem systems of knowledge were built; this early colonialist period is especially 
important as the one in which our modem language was established, a language based 
on self and other, ours and theirs. This is the language of a cartography developed in 
conjunction with a new subjectivity where the subject was a white male and this 
divisive language is the one that has defined modem structures of knowledge. 
Sadie Plant argues that women have found their symbolic home, their language, in the 
matrix, in the networks of information technology (plant 1998), in this argument, the 
same subject marginalized by Enlightenment thinking and the same approaches to 
knowledge that have been through this period excluded, are those that are thriving in 
the connectivity of technology. This very different subject coming to the fore in 
accordance with the very different spaces that are emerging in the late twentieth, early 
twentyfirst century has been examined in the previous chapter. 
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2.3 ANATOMICAL DISCOVERY - SPATIAL REVELA nONS. 
The anatomisation of the body from the sixteenth century was an inherently spatial 
process: "space, the positioning of the body within a three dimensional matrix, was the 
key to anatomical understanding. And the discovery of space was one of the key 
conceptual shifts that took place in Europe in the early modern period ... The study of 
anatomy was the study of space" (Sawday 1995, p86, original emphasis). In the 
medieval period one's body was a standard for spatial measurement: "Space whether 
immediate, geographical, sociological or cultural, was basically linked to physical 
perception, especially that of the hand and the arm" says Le Roy Ladurie in his history 
of a French medieval village where, "Their notion of it [space] was bounded by two 
philosophical concepts ofMontaillou, corpus and domus, body and house. The body 
was the measure of the world, in the first place and when the world was too large to be 
measured by the body its place would be taken by the domus." To use Le Roy's 
examples: "I was sunning myself behind my house and four or five spans away 
Guillame Andorran was reading a book." Whereas "If you want to have an idea of 
Heaven ... Imagine a huge domus stretching from the Merens Pass to the town of 
Toulouse" (Le Roy Ladurie 1978, p282-283). Where the body had been used as a 
consistent measure of the world, anatomical discovery exposed the body as a whole 
new spatial model in itself, a model inconsistent with the exterior world, requiring new 
explanations of space rather than being explanatory of space. In articulation with such 
reconfigurations of the body in relation to the world were alterations to the meanings 
invested in time. This section will show that in this early modern period, spatial 
revolution and its accordant impact on the relevance of temporal order, was tied to a 
fundamental change in the concept of the body and the subject, an indication that we 
might expect some significant alterations in concepts of the body as part of current 
spatial and temporal shifts. It will later be argued that the disruption of boundaries 
and exchange across borders, actually and metaphorically, is that which is significantly 
new in an emergent thinking about the body, so this section will look at some of the 
religious, philosophical, scientific, linguistic foundations upon which those conceptual 
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divisions were founded, and briefly illustrate their expression in a language of maps 
where a line of defence was drawn between the exterior and the interior of the body. 
Andreas Vesalius was the Flemish anatomist who challenged the established theories of 
Greek physicist, Galen, and began a new era of scientific investigation. His major 
work The Seven Books on the Structure oj the Human Body was published in 1543, 
the same year of Copernicus' death and the publication of De revolutionibus orbium 
coelestium which placed the sun, rather than the Earth, at the centre of the Universe. 
Vesalius' work contained the first accurate descriptions and depictions of human 
anatomy. Here began a period in Europe of intense fascination with dissection, a 
fascination that operated on a grotesque, morbid level as well as on a scientific plane 
and the anatomy theatre was exactly that, a theatre where crowds would gather to 
witness the performance of dissection, just as they might visit a play. In this 
performance the anatomist not only played the starring role, he was the "heroic 
voyager and intrepid discoverer" (Sawday 1995, p24). 
The interdependency of the colonial project and the anatomists project was such that if 
one failed so would the other, they shared a goal - the mastery of space, a language, a 
tool - the map, and an attitude, one of conquest. Accordingly, the fear of the 
unknown, evident in the strategies and language of explorations of the "new world", is 
also a defining factor in shaping concepts of the body. Fears associated with the body 
could not be extemalised as unconquered or unknown territories could, instead the 
fear was of what might lie within, a fear of self, and this posed philosophical and 
spiritual dilemmas at least as challenging as the material tasks. The fear of, and 
associated fascination with, the bodily interior is reflected in the cultural production of 
the Renaissance, particularly in the poetry of John Donne (1572 - 1631) and others of 
the metaphysical school, where images of the body devouring itself, of the monster 
within, are thematic (Sawday 1995). Whereas in geographical mapping the monsters 
were left lurking in the margins and gaps left by failures in knowledge, dissection 
began to reveal what seemed, at first, to be the monstrous interior of the body, and this 
monster was within every individual. One illustration of the quite different perception 
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of boundaries in contemporary theory, is that the monster has now become a powerful 
metaphor for hybridity and for the freedom to be found in the spaces between 
subjectivities. (5) 
To appreciate the philosophical and spiritual implications of what the interior body 
revealed to the early anatomists it is necessary to firstly understand the held 
expectations and assumptions with which these explorations were entered into. In this 
pre-scientific era, the whole approach to the world was underpinned by a deeply held 
religious belief, that of the divine creation of the Universe, and of man within this 
creation. The interior of the body was expected to be a microcosm of the exterior 
world, it was anticipated that the unified and hannonious construction of the world 
would be visibly reflected in the physical ordering of the internal organs, so it was with 
this conceptual framework that the anatomists entered the body - armed with the 
language and tools of geographical exploration. 
However, the visible, tangible complexity of the physicality of the body repeatedly 
problematized this explanation. Rather than finding a terrain of hills and rivers, the 
body revealed compartments each unique in terms of structure and behaviour, within 
each cavity were further spaces, one small cavity might appear to contain pints and 
pints of blood, another would harbour yards of intestine, phenomena which in no way 
reflected a harmonious and divine construction. The unpredictability of volumes and 
depthlessness of cavities, defied reason; no overall pattern could be formulated as to 
(5) For subversions of the monster metaphor see Nina Lykke 'Between Monsters, Goddesses and 
Cyborgs' and Rosi Braidotti "Signs of Wonder and Traces of Doubt: On Teratology and Embodied 
Differences" in Between Monsters, Goddesses and Cyborgs. Feminist Confrontations with Science, 
Medicine and Cyberspace, edited by Nina Lykke and Rosi Braidotti (London, Zed Books. 1996). 
Lykke subverts both the language of Enlightenment discourse, and the concept of the boundary as a 
part of that discourse, by asking "the monster metaphor to perform as a representation of boundary 
phenomena in the interdisciplinary or hybrid grey zone between the cultural and natural sciences" 
(p4) and by naming goddesses and cyborgs also as hybrid figures, where "Both are .... designed to 
transgress the borders between human and non-human" (P24). Braidotti uses the monster to disrupt 
Enlightenment rationalism: "Being figures of complexity, monsters lend themselves to a layering of 
discourse and also to a play of the imagination which defies rationalistic reductions" (pl35). Both use 
the monster as a way of upturning the process of "othering" on which modem science has been built. 
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the spatial behaviour of different bodily organs or regions. Instead of reflecting the 
universe in its geographies, or time in its order, the body displayed completely new 
forms of spatial organisation. 
The pre-modem era had been defined by a temporal order; it was the cycles of the sun, 
moon and seasons that shaped and framed human existence, defining the framework of 
the day, of a lifetime, and the divine creation of man was conceived of in terms of a 
chronology. "Time and order were virtually synonymous; indeed what was dis-order 
but an absence of the governing principles of time, a retreat into an unstable world of 
continual flux?" (Sawday 1995, p91, original emphasis). And the body represented 
precisely this instability, resistant to the established order of the universe, "The 
mystical relationship between body and soul ... were undermined to a degree from 
which a theology ... of existence was never to recover" (Sawday 1995, p92). 
This is not to say that temporality was superseded by spatiality, but that the 
conjunction of spatial revelations brought about by colonization and anatomy, as well 
as astronomy and perspective as developed in the Renaissance from the 15th century, 
brought about the necessity of finding some spatial order to frame the universe, and of 
reasoning man's place within the universe, physically and spiritually, in spatial terms. 
As Sawday explains, 
to the inflexible rule of time, new science offered an alternative: the advent of 
spatial rather than temporal order... Space, whether conceived of as the limitless 
voids revealed by post-Copernican theory, or the dense articulation of space within 
the minute interstices ofpost-Vesalian dissection, not merely challenged the 
supremacy of Chronos, but revealed possibilities hitherto undreamed of. (Sawday 
1995, p91). 
Without a spatial key the anatomist was faced with a project from which there was no 
going back, he had embarked on an endless voyage into the depths of the body which 
appeared could be infinitely dissected, each revelation another variable, resistant to 
prediction. (Sawday 1995) 
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"For all their continual assertions that the body mirrored harmonious orchestration 
of the universe, what they confronted in reality was something else: a structure of 
such bewildering complexity, such a confusion of function and organic integrity. 
~at the ou~come of every such interior voyage hovered on the edge of disaster. . The 
mwardly directed gaze traversed not simply regions of doubt, but transformed the 
body into the locus of all doubt" (Sawday 1995, p88). 
In the light of these early anatomical explorations, religious and 
philosophical debates about the relationship between body and soul 
became intense, if the interior of the body demonstrated such monstrous 
capacities and capabilities, how could it then be part of the divine creation? 
This fundamental challenge to the presumptions of religion was met, 
initially, by a determined effort to impose a geographical order on the 
body, but the body appeared to be consistent only in its inconsistency. So a 
process was begun whereby the body became separated from the divine, it 
became instead the corruptible vessel that housed the divine soul. 
"Calvinistic theology," for example, "with its seemingly obsessive desire to 
chart the inner state of each individual's spiritual well-being, was to argue 
with a conviction equal to that of a scientist that the division between the 
realm of the body and realm of the soul was now the concern of every 
thinking person" (Sawday 1995, pI7). Differentiation was necessary 
between the monstrous physical interior of the body and the purity of the 
soul, and so the two were pitted against each other, the soul in continual 
battle with the corruptible body, 
'Mastery' over the body, the conquering of its desires, the endless war against the 
ravages of sin, or 'soul sickness', is a feature of early modem culture wbic h provides the 
determining framework in which the body's internal dimensions were to be understood. 
(Sawday 1995, p20). 
The journey, through the bodily interior was traced like a map and with it came the 
cartographic terminology: "these early discoverers dotted their names, like place-
names on a map, over the terrain which they encountered" (Sawday 1995, p23). By 
adopting the particular language of the colonialist, the anatomists moved under the 
colonial mantle of conquest and possession and assumed the divisive, elitist elements of 
a structure of knowledge that was to grow into modem science. That the body 
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experienced its first scientific investigations within such a discourse has set the 
framework for all future discussion around the body, so that: 
In the. ~entie~ cen~ it is virtually impossible to think about the body outside the 
prevailing medical-SCIentific discourse. What we consider to be primarily the focus 
of medical attention ... has in other epochs been entertained under quite drrrerent 
categorie~ .of des~ription .. Those categories, bounded by theology and cosmology _ 
the polannes of ntual - did not admit the possibility of thinking about the body as a 
discrete entity. (Sawday 1995, p16). 
Where cartography had found a, perhaps superficial, method by which to contain 
geographical space within an order akin to that of time, the body was resistant to such 
order, "its recalcitrant and rebellious longing for physical and sensual existence, 
delineates the battle-lines between material and immaterial existence as well as , 
between subject and object in a grammatical sense" (Sawday 1995, p20). Necessarily 
then, the body becomes increasingly separated from the divine and from the physical 
world which, at this stage, retained its status as part of the divine creation, and most 
importantly the body is distinguished from the self, the subject. 
The body then, as now, can be seen standing in a position where its vulnerability is 
balanced by its power or potential, at the forefront of the Enlightenment. It was the 
body's physicality that was subject to scrutiny but this had resounding implications for 
spiritual and philosophical debates around body and soul and the divine creation; the 
body as "the locus of doubt" was also the locus of interest, of debate, of 
transfonnation. The early modem body seems in this way to be situated very closely 
to the body of today, that is, as a focus of cultural and scientific activity, acting almost 
as a litmus test for the acceptability or morality of new technologies or cultures. 
As no overall governing principle to the organisation of the bodily interior could be 
found, each discovery was instead measured, weighed and recorded in careful detail 
and in this way tenuously claimed as known. Here lies a significant difference between 
the explorations of the "new world" and the exploration of the body: for the 
explorations of the body heralded measurement and classification - the two overriding 
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themes of the Scientific Revolution. Empiricism can be seen as a method by which the 
lack of principle in spatial construction was contained. The unknowable nature of the 
body's recesses were offset by methodical measurement, description and depiction. 
In this transformational process the body and soul had become oppostional forces and 
a conceptual barrier had been forced between the interior and exterior environments 
, 
they had been distinguished, foreclosing the possibility of interactivity between inside 
and outside the body. "Spittle, blood, milk, urine, faeces or tears by simply issuing 
forth have traversed the boundary of the body. So also have bodily parings, skin, nail, 
hair clippings and sweat. The mistake is to treat bodily margins in isolation from all 
other margins" (Douglas 1966, p 121). This is precisely the "mistake" of Western 
thought; the surface of the body has come to be conceived of as a defence between 
interiority and exteriority, a barrier between the harsh outside world and the 
corruptible interior body. Despite daily evidence to the contrary, the belief, firstly that 
the margins of the body are impermeable, and secondly that the stuff inside our bodies 
is discrete from stuff outside our bodies has been largely, until recently, sustained. 
The spiritual problems raised by the body's resistance to spatial organisation were 
eased by altering the framework within which the body was conceived. Although the 
body was claimed as terrain, the geographical approach proved inadequate on its own 
and from the late seventeenth century the body as machine became the prevalent 
metaphor. By relinquishing the desire to incorporate the body into a divine scheme, at 
least some religious tenets could be upheld. This mechanisation of the body served, 
alongside the Cartesian philosophical separation of mind from body in the early 
seventeenth century, to complete the bifurcation of the subject. Not only was the 
thinking self distinct from the mechanised body but this bifurcated entity was further 
dislocated from the surrounding environment. 
Gazing introspectively into the interior in Cartesian meditation, the human subject 
had become aware that the 'self' was an apparently contingent mechanism ... 
So, 'selfhood' - the sense of having or being a unified self - was maintained only 
when the self ceased to think about the self. In the formulation of the cogito, only 
the "I" that was aware of itself thinking could announce the certainty of existence. 
And, paradoxically, in the very moment of certainty the sense of wholeness, 
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... ,collapsed ... The human subject oscillated, now, between unthinking unity and 
reflective dislocation. (Sawday 1995 p159). ' 
The Cartesian model, is not fully explanatory of changes to the idea of the individual. 
The political philosophy of Hobbes, documented by Macpherson as an early advocate 
of liberal democracy, challenges the immaterialism of Cartesian thought and posits the 
individual within grounded political terms, with: 
" ... its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or 
capacities, owing nothing to society for them. The individual was seen neither as a 
moral whole, nor as part of a larger social whole, but as an owner of himself ... 
Society becomes a lot of free equal individuals related to each other as proprietors of 
their own capacities" (Macpherson 1962, p3). 
Hobbes was a self proclaimed 'modern' philosopher, which primarily entailed a 
rejection of Aristotelian political philosophy generally and the belief in the highest 
good of man particularly - the belief that good citizenship and leadership are infectious, 
that man moves towards the highest denominator. For Hobbes "the state of nature" is 
one in which each individual pursues their own happiness and, while this needn't 
necessarily lead to conflict, it often will- if an individual is greedy, or if an individual's 
desires do not coincide with an other individual's desires. To guard against such 
conflicts, which could devleop into war or violence, the individual must abandon the 
"state of nature" and entrust the protection of their safety and freedom to a strong 
state. (Penguin DictiOnary of Philosophy 1997,251-252) Sawday links Hobbes' 
fundamental rejection of Cartesian philosophy to the ascension of space over time, he 
says that: "The new philosophy of Francesco Patrizi ... posited the priority of space in 
what has been termed 'the order of time and being'. Patrizi' s spatium - a forerunner of 
Newtonian conceptions of space, and a prelude to the discovery of the possiblity of 
spatial infinity - could be thought of as an anticipation of Hobbes's brusque, post-
Cartesian demolition of scholastic philosophy on the grounds of corporeal rather than 
temporal existence" (Sawday 1995, p91). However, like Cartesian thought, Hobbes' 
thinking demands, from a different basis, separations for the individual: firstly there 
must be a rejection of the natural state and secondly the individual is placed in a 
defensive position in relation to other individuals. Evelyn Fox Keller argues that 
53 
elements of modem science are reliant on such a concept of the defensive sel( a prime 
example being the selfish gene of Darwinian theory, where autonomy becomes equated 
with competitiveness and the individual must defend themselves against others and 
against the "state of nature". 
'Hobbesian man': simultaneously autonomous and oppositional, connected to the 
world in which it finds itself not by the promise of life and growth but primarily by 
the threat of death and loss, its first and foremost need being the defense of its 
boundaries. In psychological terms, we might say that such an individual betrayS an 
idealized conception of autonomy: one that presupposes a radical conception of-self 
and simultaneously attributes to the relation between self and other an automatic 
negative valence, a relation, finally, not so much of independence as of dynamic 
opposition. (Keller 1996, pI56). 
The idea of the "possessive individual", and of society as constituted by a collection of 
such individuals, a politicised notion of self and community, can be seen as facilitated 
by the rise of print capitalism. Benedict Anderson has argued that the concept of 
"nation" rose from the abandonment of three primary tenets of belief: 
The first of these was the idea that a particular script-language offered privileged 
access to ontological truth, precisely because it was an inseparable part of that truth 
... Second was the belief that society was naturally organized around and under high 
centre - ruled by some form of cosmological (divine) dispensation ... Third was a 
conception of temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable, 
the origins of the world and of men essentially identical. (Anderson 1991, p36). 
The move away from the belief in a "divine dispensation" and the separation of 
cosmology from history can, as shown, both be seen as made necessary by the 
confusing spatiality of the body. Anderson says that these factors along with the rise 
of print capitalism "made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think 
about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways" 
(Anderson 1991, p36). The new relations, enabled by print, would seem in some ways 
to reinforce the Hobbesian notion of the individual; "[b]y enlarging the gap .. , As 
inherent in language, print allows a distance to intervene between speaker and listener 
and this gap permits the individual to think, coolly to judge the words of the other 
without his or her overbearing presence" (poster 1995, p60). Print in this reading can 
be seen to leave the individual's defences intact, even to strengthen those boundaries. 
while at the same time the rise of the newspaper, and the shared experience of the 
news, strengthens the concept of collective circumstance. 
5~ 
The ob~les~ence of the newspaper on the morrow of its printing ... Creates this 
e:;:traor~ mass ceremony; the almost precisely simultaneous consumption 
( Imagmmg ) of the newspaper-as-fiction .... The significance of this mass 
ceremony - Hegel observed that newspapers serve modem man as a substitute for 
modem prayers - is paradoxical. It is performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the 
s~. Yet ~ch communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being 
replicated slmultaneoulsy by thousands ( or millions) of others of whose existence he 
is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion. (Anderson 1991, 
p35). 
So, the challenges that the spatial organsation of the body posed philosophically and 
religiously can be identified as a crucial contributory factor in the reconfiguration of 
the subject, and the growth of print capitalism shown to be vital both in the 
dissemination and reinforcement of these new ways of thinking the self in relation to 
others. Indeed, Sawday connects the body and printing even more tightly together 
when he uses Walter Ong's argument that the development of movable type was a 
spatial process that contributed to the primatisation of space over time and was 
conceived of within the same framework as the anatomical spatialisation of the body. 
With the invention of printing came a much greater commitment to space - the 
organisation of knowledge according to spatial co-ordinates. The technique of 
printing after the invention of movable type - where letters in a font are cast from a 
'matrix' , and then dispersed into "text" in an infinite number of possible 
permutations - corresponded, Ong has suggested, to the Ramist development of 
organising discourse in space ... This ordering of discourse was akin to the 
progressive partitioning of the body in anatomical demonstration, and thus indebted 
to a language of the body at every point. (Sawday 1995, p136). 
Spatial and temporal transformation along with new modes of communication are in 
this period inextricably tied to transformational concepts of the body and the subject, 
and these sea-changes in thinking and knowing the world, triggered by discoveries and 
rediscoveries, and coexistent with an influx of new information,amount to a period of 
true revolution. The suggestion of Ong above exemplifies the interweaving of the 
body with space and communication as elemental to the modem framework of 
knowledge. Other chapters will argue that we have entered a comparable but 
intensified period of change. By tracing the direction of contemporary spatial, 
temporal and communication shifts and the manifestations of these trends in new 
conceptions of the body, it is anticipated that the possibility of a new experience of the 
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body can be shown. The above link between the body and text is particularly resonant 
because the body as a text, a surface inscribed by culture, has been a recent dominant 
theme (6), yet resonance does not mean the same and it is that which is different which 
must be identified in order to understand what is revolutionary in current 
developments. In this section various separations have shown to have been wrought: 
between man and god, body and soul, exteriority and interiority and self and others. In 
the following chapter the categorisation of science and disciplining of knowledge will 
be discussed as confirming and enforcing the modem compartmentalisation of 
knowledge and of the bounded body within such thinking. 
(6) Judith Butler's Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York, London, 
Routledge, 1990) is probably the earliest explicit contemporary theoretical account of the body as a 
surface written on by culture, further developed by Butler in Bodies that Matter. On the Discursive 
Limits a/Sex (New York., London, Routledge, 1993). A fictional and more fluid expression of such 




SCIENCE: A LANGUAGE. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION. 
The significance of science to this project is that it is representative of dominant, 
modern, Western ways of knowing the world. This section will not talk a great deal 
about the body but rather concentrate on this particular system of knowledge, and its 
language, as the frame by which the body has come to be understood in relation to the 
rest of the world. The effects of new explorations which "abruptly widened the 
cultural and geographical horizon and hence also men's conception of possible fonns 
of human life" (Anderson 1991, p16) have already been shown as a spark for the 
Enlightenment, and the process by which the soul was distinguished from a corruptible 
body and a harsh earthly existence has also been illustrated. A new language, 
fundamentally dichotomous in its nature, has been seen to develop from the 
foundations of cartography, with its markation of boundaries and lines of defence, and 
a new bounded modem subject, inhabiting a mechanised body, seen to appear. 
It was in the emergence of a scientific explanation of the world that these concepts 
were crystallised and validated for, as will be argued, classical science, founded on the 
perceived constancy of time and an order observed from nature, and with its particular 
approach and language, purported to hold a relationship to truth that allowed it the 
position of a doctrine, a system of belief The relevance of this to the project is that 
the success of science in explaining the world has both defined a particular approach to 
the body and tended to detach corporeal experience from the realm of "truth" and 
knowledge. This section will illustrate the power and authority of the language of 
science - as representative of a mechanised system of knowing - from its roots in the 
observations and categorisation of nature through to Newtonian science. The 
following chapter will then develop these ideas in relation to scientific activity in the 
twentieth and twenty first century where alterations to such approaches and 
explanations are apparent. Detailed attention is paid to the centrality of metaphor in 
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the development of a scientific language, this is because when contemporary 
indications of change to the way we know our world are examined, the possibility of 
describing this altered world is also demonstrated as framed by new metaphors and 
models, largely revealed by science and technology. 
3.2 ORDERING NATURE AND THE METAPHORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CLASSIFICATION. 
This section focuses on the categorisation of the natural world and particularly on the 
processes of transition from a cosmic, holistic language to a compartmentalised, 
disciplined scientific language. The second chapter described the emergence of a 
defensive language defined by self and other which developed in articulation with a 
newly spatial world, but the alterations to language require further exposition because 
it is the parameters of language that frame the limits within which it is possible to 
describe, and hence to legitimately "know", the body in relation to a concept of self 
and to the rest of the world. 
Through the middle ages learning was contained and hidden in the libraries of 
monasteries, where access to ancient texts was restricted or even censored, and where 
knowledge was shared only among a selected few. It is unsurprising that within such a 
culture learning did not tend to progress, indeed amongst the learned monks was an 
awareness that a great deal of what had once had been known had been lost, learning 
was a matter of retrieval rather than of progression, and retrieval of ancient knowledge 
and technologies was severely curtailed by the often possessive and protective 
guardianship of monasteries. 
However, the processes of the Enlightenment were concerned with the bringing to 
light, the revelation, of knowledge, "the task of scientific enlightenment - the 
illumination of the reality behind appearances - is an inversion of surface and interior, 
an interchange between visible and invisible" (Keller 1992, p41). Where knowledge 
had been previously guarded, the culture of knowing was turned inside out so that the 
mysteries of the natural world became the territory of Science, where the role of the 
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scientist came to be the revelation of the secrets of nature. Keller argues that early 
knowledge of the natural world was perceived as an insight into the workings of God 
and therefore necessarily kept as secret; indeed conditional to knowing the workings of 
the divine construction was the preservation of those mysteries. 
A rcana Dei signalled forbidden knowledge, the hidden affairs or workings of God. .. 
To be allowed to share in God's secrets meant to be enclosed by the same protective 
veil. The knowledge acquired by those privileged few who had gained such access 
remained similarly (and properly) shrouded in secrecy. Once known secrets did not 
become open knowledge in our sense of the term: rather knowledge itself remained 
secret. (Keller 1992, p57, original emphasis). 
It was within the turbulent period of the early Enlightenment that Copernicus, a 
canonised Catholic, wrote his treatise on a heliocentric universe, and the enormous 
conflicts he felt between the value of his science and his religious faith epitomise the 
antagonisms between the old and new. While for some "It seemed as though a new 
world was on the point of birth. All that was a strong and youthful and vigorous 
revolted against the past. Never, perhaps, have the social authorities so unanimously 
supported the intellectual movement" (Henri Pirenne, quoted in Banville 1976, p204), 
Copernicus' faith aligned him far more closely with the concept of Arcana Dei, and he 
feared the consequences on the peoples faith that his treatise might have, a fictionalised 
account puts it this way, "But very soon they [the people] will come to see what it is I 
have done, I mean what they will imagine I have done, diminished Earth, made of it 
merely another planet among planets, they will begin to despise the world, and 
something will die ... " (Banville 1976, p207). His science was in direct contradiction to 
this faith and his extreme reluctance to publish, which only occurred in the year of his 
death, is exemplary of this. 
Had Copernicus been working slightly later such a conflict might not have occurred, 
for just as the corporeal body had been separated from the realm of God as a means of 
preserving a faith in the divine construction of the world, an accordant move can be 
seen to have occurred in the realm of nature, what Keller describes as a "rhetorical 
shift in the locus of essential secrets from God to Nature" (Keller 1992, p56-57). This 
relocation of the mysteries oflife in conjunction with the equation of kno\vledge with 
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truth and revelation meant that whereas "the idea of Arcana Dei invited privileged 
entrance into a veiled inner sanctum, the expression 'secrets of nature' came to be 
heard as an invitation to dissolving, or to ripping ope~ the veil of secrecy" (Keller 
1992, pS7). 
As nature was freed from God, enquiring minds were at liberty to look for a key or an 
order to the world within the domain of nature. "The secrets of nature are no lonaer 
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secrets, the intellectual boldness of scientists will put Nature's gifts at our feet" (Carlo 
Ginzburg quoted in Keller 1992, pS8). Just as the challenge of the complexities of the 
interior body had been met by the internal voyagers with detailed measurement, 
description and depictio~ the bold scientist's approach to the diversities of the natural 
world was one of recording, depicting and most importantly categorising, and in the 
emergence of a natural history, modern Science found its footing in classification. 
Whereas the earlier conception of the universe and man as harmonious elements of a 
divine construction had necessarily demanded an interconnected way of understanding 
the world, in the Enlightened age categorical boundaries were drawn between various 
aspects of the world and commonalities or correspondences between categorisations 
were underplayed, as a means to finding a much sought after order. The development 
of this approach, Renee Heller argues, has resulted in science distancing itself from the 
big questions about the operations of the natural world, finding its role instead in 
attempting to understand increasingly specialised aspects. 
The methodological and sociological specialisation of science - beginning with the 
scientific revolution and refined in the nineteenth century with the 
professionalization of the sciences - led to the abandonment of broad and general 
questions about cosmic interrelatedness. Before the scientific revolution, 
cosmologists studied the tracks of the planets and stars not just for timekeeping. 
They also considered them as important conveyors of religious and symbolic 
meaning, and they speculated about the place of humanity in the cosmos. With the 
growth of specialised disciplines, these functions became separated. Metaphysical 
questions on 'the Whole became the other of science. This is an aspect of the 
reductionism of modem science. (Heller 199a6, p75). 
Contemporary criticism of the reductionist tendencies of science must be countered by 
an understanding of why such contained methods developed, and also recognition of 
the vast progress in certain aspects of knowledge that this approach enabled. The 
anatomists had tried to find a system of fitting the interior of the body into a cosmic 
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explanation and failed, they had found themselves unable to answer a big question and 
instead focused on answering lots of much smaller questions, in this they could 
succeed. So when Alvin Toffier writing on the reemergence in the twentieth century 
of large questions into the arena of science, says: 
One of the most highly developed skills in contemporary Western civilization is 
dissection: the split -up of problems into their smallest possible components. We are 
good at it. So good, we often forget to put the pieces back together again. This skill 
is perhaps most finely honed in science. There we not only routine Iv break 
problems down to bite-sized chunks and mini-chunks, we then very 'often isolate 
each one from its environment by means of useful trick. We say ceferis paribus - all 
other things being equal. In this way we can ignore the complex interactions 
between our problem and the rest of the universe. (Toffler 1984, xi). 
It must also be said that it is perhaps only possible to return now to the larger issues 
because the smaller ones have, at least partially, been resolved. To use Thomas 
Kuhn's analogy of a jigsaw puzzle (by which he describes the methods and rules of 
science), a sensible first step when you tip out the box and are faced with hundreds of 
jumbled pieces is to sort them out into different basic types: comers, edge, sky. 
Although this involves generalising, it is very difficult to solve the jigsaw, to start to 
put the picture together so to speak, until you have done so. However, there are other 
ways to go about solving a jigsaw and one of the problems with the processes of 
modern science, is, due to the privileged status it came to hold in relationship to truth, 
all other methods and ways of knowing were excised or invalidated 
So, in the study of nature; different plants, animals, environments and people were 
organised into classified groupings and, unsurprisingly perhaps, in view of the vastness 
of the project, there came an homogenising of difference within each group, as Cuvier 
(1) says, classification is "the best means of covering the properties of beings by general 
laws" and these general laws were established by finding the dominant - or rather the 
most common characteristics: "The parts, properties or traits that conform with the 
greatest number of others, or, in other words, that have the most marked influence on 
the whole of the being, are called the important characters, the dominant characters; 
the others are called the subordinate characters, and there are degrees of each" 
(1) Baron George Cuvier, 1769-1832, developed a system of classification f?r gro~ping of animals. 
based on his studies of skeletons and fossils. This system which grouped ammals mto four phyla was 
an advancement on the system of Linneaus. 
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(quoted in Ridley 1986, 104, original emphasis). In this system, which in the jigsaw 
analogy makes very good sense, the more rare or specialised a characteristic the lower 
it is in the classification system, the broader, more general characteristics are 
prioritised. In practice such a system when used, for example, in the classifications of 
people, required that individual characteristics within groups as well as commonalities 
between groups be overlooked as a means to asserting categorisation. The same can be 
said of cartography where, "The 'central bastions' of European mapping from the 
seventeenth century onward 'were measurement and standardization' (Harley 1989, 
p4/5). In both realms, idiosyncrasy, emotionality, physicality and specificity, are 
increasingly marginalized" (Kirby 1996, p53). There is almost a sense that the activity 
of categorisation was as important in itself, as a project, as was coming to an 
understanding of the natural world for which this order purported to make sense of. 
This smoothing over of differences within groupings, the process of categorisation, can 
be seen as an expansion of the foundational metaphors of lights and dark themselves. 
As explained earlier, the metaphors of light and dark underpin modern Western 
thought, and the operations of the light and dark metaphor serves to assert a difference 
between that which is knowable and that which is not, at the same time as obscuring 
differences within these two categories; in exactly the same way as the examples of 
categorisation above. So the categorisation of the natural worlds, where the focus on 
broad and general differences between groups operates by homogenising difference 
within groups, can be seen as a development of the underlying metaphor of dark and 
light, which by grouping that which is knowable against that which is not, misleads us 
about the subtle and multiple ways in which it is possible to come to an understanding 
of our world, and tends to give a false confidence about that which is "known". 
"Irigaray calls the light of heliotropes the light of the Same ... Difference, which can 
only be figured as an absence or invisibility, is ultimately reducible to an indiscriminate 
and overpowering light in which everything appears identical" (Vasseleu 1998, p 7). 
Irigaray is speaking specifically about the concealment of maternal origin, the passage 
from the cave into light, which, she argues, is forgotten because "the fantasy which 
heliocentrism upholds is a masculine re-origination, or the appearance of giving birth 
to oneself' (Vasseleu 1998, p7), however her reading also illustrates that the obscuring 
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of subtleties in order to create differentiation between categories is a technique 
foundational to western philosophy, where all that is brought to light, to knowing. 
takes on a uniformity under the same blinding light. 
The centrality of metaphor to the success of classical science as a system of thought 
will be expanded below, but it is clear that the power of this doctrine is itself 
inseparable from western philosophy which is also metaphorically based: "Derrida 
describes philosophy as a complex interplay of concept-metaphors which, far from 
being disposable or replaced by something more exact, are instruments that are 
inextricable from the field of philosophy which they constitute" (Vasseleu 1998, p5). 
The metaphor of light has not remained static, it has developed in its relationship to 
dominant concepts of knowing and before examining the centrality of this language to 
a repression of corporeal knowing, it is worth offering a brief account of the 
development of the metaphor of light. The work of Evelyn Fox Keller, whose area of 
speciality is the role of language in science, is particularly pertinent here. Her analysis 
focuses on metaphor in a direct relationship to a hierarchy of the senses as defined by 
dominant modes of communication. In this way she makes the link between 
technologies of communication and metaphors for knowledge and the sensory body, 
connections which are so important in the discussion of contemporary shifts in 
knowledge systems. 
Keller and Grontkowski use the work of Eric Havelock to suggest that the significance 
of light to Greek philosophy is directly associated with the culture of literacy that 
emerged in this period: 
[The] transition from an oral tradition to a literate culture in ancient Greece, 
occurring between Homer and Plato, [when] not only has <the eye supplanted the ear 
as the chief organ' but that in the process a host of other changes was induced -
changes from identification and engagement to individualisation and 
disengagement, from mimesis to analysis, from the concrete to the abstract, fro~ 
mythos to logos. With the growing emphasis on the visual eye comes the growrng 
development, even birt:h, Havelock argues, of the personal 'I'. (Keller and 
Grontkowski 1996, pI88). 
So in the earliest stages of an analysis of the relationship of light to Western 
philosophy, an alteration in media of communication is identified as a trigger for a 
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change, both to the language of knowledge and to the concept of the individual. The 
written word valorised the sense of vision whereas an oral tradition had valorised 
sound, and it is within a visual culture that light becomes a metaphor for knowledge. 
"All three components of the visual system - eye, the sun, and light - are used by Plato, 
both metaphorically and directly, to establish the characteristics of intelligibility" 
(Keller and Grontkowski 1996, p 189). So in the literate culture of Greek philosophy 
these metaphors are established in a connection with knowledge and truth: 
... visibility represents the ultimate certainty of a reality that must be confirmed 
visually. Seeing light is a metaphor for seeing the invisible in the visible, or seeing 
things in an intelligible form that holds all that exists together but is itself devoid of 
sensible qualities. By means of this metaphor Plato implies a natural relation 
between existence and truth ... Rather than being a component of visibility, light has 
an originality of its own; it dawns with the appearance of things or the beings that 
come to light. (Vasseleu 1997, p3-4). 
In the Enlightenment, with the (re )-appearance of a rational, thinking individual within 
a culture of discovery, an expansion of the Greek analysis of light and knowledge 
occurs. Although light is still the medium by which truth is revealed, the 
Enlightenment individual has an active part to play in this process, there comes the 
belief that things, rather than being revealed by the dawning of light, must be brought 
to light from darkness: 
Man no longer finds accommodation for himself in the light, or the fixed structure of an 
objectively perceived world; he himself becomes an emanative force. In modern 
Enlightenment thought light is a realization of man's own nature that he brings into 
being in his transformation of the world. (Vasseleu 1997, p4). 
It becomes the role of the Enlightenment individual to expose that which was 
previously invisible, he has the authority to reveal that which was unknown: "Light is 
associated with the imperialist cultural aspirations of 'white man', or the man of 
metaphysical enlightenment for whom all that falls beyond logos is the indeterminate 
darkness that must be overcome and brought to the truth of common (sun)light" 
(Vasseleu 1997, p6). 
A further development, again in articulation with a developing idea of the modern 
subject, can be identified in the philosophy of Descartes. By this time the metaphor of 
light is so embedded within the language that is almost forgotten to be metaphorical: 
"these connections between light and knowledge were so much part of the intellectual 
fabric that Descartes scarcely had to acknowledge his debt to Platonism in any of its 
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forms" (Keller and Grontkowski 1996, p 192). Light and vision in Descartes are fused 
with an increasingly mechanised understanding of the operations of the world: 
As light and vision become more explicitly technical, physical phenomena, the eye 
itself a more mechanical device, the active knower is forced ever more sharply out of 
the bodily realm. The subject becomes finally severed from the objects of perception. 
With the move, the knowing agent has lost its last links to the percipient organism 
whose sense organs can now be relegated safely to the 'purely material' . Having 
made the eye purely passive, all intellectual activity is reserved to the T, which, 
however, is radically separate from the body which houses it. (Keller, Grontkowski, 
1996, pI94). 
In this way light and vision, the noble sense, becomes further associated with rational 
objective knowledge and the mind, and further distanced from the corporeal 
experience of the world. Keller and Grontkowski argue that vision is separable from 
bodily existence, that it can be conceived of beyond the body, where other senses can 
not, "We can imagine a disembodied mind having visual experiences but not tactile 
ones. Sight does not require our being part of the material world in the way in which 
feeling by touching does." (Vesey cited in Keller and Grontkowski 1996, p2000). 
Descartes work on optics, Keller and Grontkowski say, led, via a crisis to the absolute 
separation of a knowing mind from a physical body: 
Descartes' inquiries into the nature of vision an optics were of paramount 
importance in the Western acceptance of the copy theory of perception. He, perhaps 
more than any other Western thinker was responsible for laying the emission theory 
to rest, with the result that the eye was henceforth regarded as a purely passive lens 
which simply receives the images projected from without. The consequence of this 
shift for our theories of knowledge were critical... Either we accept the conclusion 
that knowledge itself if passive, or we abandon the visual metaphor", Descartes ... 
Enabled us to retain both the conception of knowledge as active and the use of the 
visual metaphor by severing the "seeing" of the intellect and physical seeing - by 
severing finally, the mind from the body. (Keller and Grontkowski 1996, pl92, 
original emphasis). 
The association of light and vision with rational knowledge then has served to separate 
knowledge from corporeality, and the ways of knowing that come from sensory 
experience of living in the world, have come to be discredited as irrational and non-
objective, when in fact, as will be shown, the objective truth claims of science have 
been achieved largely metaphorically, and sustained by the denial of that metaphorical 
foundation. 
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As discussed in the contemporary context, although vision is undoubtedly the 
primatised sense, it may be that associations of light and vision with truth require 
revision for, 
In a time when ~hysics has once again altered our conception of vision and light. when 
we know that neIther the apparent atemporality not the 'dynamic neutrality' of vision 
are features of reality, but only of our relatively coarse daily observations it seems 
appropriate to reassess our commitment to the ideal which these features imply. 
(Keller, Grontkowski 1996, p200). 
Such a reassessment will also demand a reassessment of the validity of sensory, bodily 
ways of knowing. Not only has contemporary science altered our concepts of stability, 
location and objectivity, but also, in a world of computerised graphics and virtual 
technology, we are all aware that seeing is not always believing, so the equation of 
vision with truth is necessarily questioned. Hans Jonas, again cited in Keller and 
Grontkowski, argues that vision has a "distinctively spatial rather than temporal 
character.. a property uniquely responsible for our capacity to grasp the' extended 
now' ." (Keller and Grontkowski 1996, p 197), which ideally locates the qualities of 
vision, within the framed spatial world of classical science. 
Seeing at a distance implies, according to Jonas, an objectivity not available to the 
other senses, an apparent neutrality: "I have nothing to do but to look, and the object 
is not affected by that ... and I am not affected" (Keller, Grontkowski 1996, p 198). 
However Jonas sees this objective detachment as illusory, "At the same time, however, 
it is precisely by virtue of its causal detachment that sight is the 'least "realistic" of the 
senses,' and Jonas departs radically from Plato in concluding that when the 'underlying 
strata of experience, notably motility and touch' are rejected, 'sight' becomes barren to 
truth'." (Keller and Grontkowski 1996, pI98). 
The strength of the association of light with knowledge is then clear, and, as explained 
in the previous chapter, in the processes of exploring and explaining the "new" world 
and the interior of the body, this metaphorical foundation developed in interaction with 
a new concept of subjectivity to describe a knowing subject who was white, western 
and male and all those who were not white, western or male, were consigned to the 
dark and unknowing side of the equation. In the era of classification, where the 
criteria for classification are only same or different, this binary approach was extended 
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to encompass all observations of the natural worlds. Inherent to this framework was 
the exclusion of sensory, physical experience from the realm of truth. 
The extension of this framework is the extension of the darkllight metaphor to all 
aspects of language, and by the seventeenth century a binarisation of language is 
completed; "the rhetorical shift in the locus of essential secrets from God to Nature" 
which allowed man to embark on a scientific journey of discovery, "Over time, the 
metaphorical import of this shift is momentous" (Keller 1992, p56/7). Evelyn Fox 
Keller explains that 
... along with the change in meaning for the terms God and Nature went a 
simultaneous change of meaning for the terms man and woman. The very 
construction, 'secrets of nature' , called forth a metaphoric convergence between 
women, life and nature that bound these terms together in a new way, and in so 
doing, contributed to changes in all their meanings. (Keller 1992, p59). 
This categorical structuring of knowledge and the associated metaphorical process 
finally established the association of science with truth (and light), indeed as Nancy 
Leys Stepan goes so far as to "suggest that the metaphors functioned as the science 
itself - that without them science did not exist. In short, metaphors and analogies can 
be constituent elements of science." This metaphorical basis was successfully obscured 
so that "metaphor became associated with the imagination, poetic fancy, subjective 
figures and even untruthfulness and was contrasted with truthful, unadorned, objective 
knowledge - that is, with science itself' (Stepan 1996, pI21). 
Foucault asserts that in the seventeenth century "the written word ceases to be 
included among the signs and forms of truth. .. It is the task of words to translate the 
truth if they can: but they no longer have the fight to be considered the mark of it" 
(Foucault 1989, p56). Foucault argues that prior to the seventeenth century, Natural 
History, as it is now known, was a holistic discipline, where hearsay, myth, 
observation, uses of a plant or animal and so on, together constituted a knowledge. 
However as classification established itself as a method for understanding nature, these 
various ways of knowing a plant or creature were separated out and signs became 
signs about a plant or creature rather than an intrinsic part of plant or creature itself 
In Foucault's words: 
67 
History was the inextricable and completely unitary fabric of all that was visible of 
things and of the signs that had been discovered or lodged in them... The division, 
so evident to us, between what we see, what others have observed and handed do\\ n. 
and what others imagine or naively believe, the great tripartition, but for the much ' 
ID?re precise and much more constraining reason that signs were then part of the 
things themselves, whereas in the seventeenth century they became modes of 
representation. (Foucault 1989, pI29). 
So it can be seen that language, and particularly the use of metaphor, is implicit in this 
fragmentation of meanings and that this period can be identified as the point from 
which symbolic language became operational within a purely dichotomous exchange. 
In finding a new language for a new world, other ways of understanding were 
invalidated, this process was to be consolidated in the alignment of science with 
"truth" . 
It is only in the twentieth century that this alignment of science with objectivity and 
truth has been called into question. The sense of loss, which characterises aspects of 
much twentieth century theory, and from which postmodernism has flourished, can be 
identified with this separation oflanguage, into oppositions and away from the body. 
The work of Freud precedes anti-Enlightenment discourse and, in many ways, he 
anticipates it with his identification of the suppression of instinct by the constraints of 
culture as the source of "man's" neurosis. Yet Freudian psychoanalysis also succeeds 
in establishing a further dichotomy, between the conscious and the unconscious and in 
this sense can be seen as the most significant contemporary expansion of the dark and 
light dichotomy. Psychoanalysis finds it ground precisely in the split of consciousness 
from the unconscious, the dissociated psychoanalytical identity, and can be seen as the 
culmination of the split between man and woman, god and nature, self and other that 
was completed in the Scientific Revolution. This fission between self and other is 
embedded in the split Cartesian subject, but now the self, already separated from the 
corporeal world, is itself split; in the process of the development of the ego, in the 
defence and protection of the interior self, a separation is wrought between self and 
world (Freud 1930). 
An in depth analysis of the difficulties with psychoanalysis are beyond the remit of this 
project, the relevance here is that subsequent readers of Freud, particularly what might 
be called the "French Feminists" (Cixous, Irigaray), have attempted to rescue language 
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from the oppositional discourse of Western philosophy, understanding this as the route 
to a reconnection with the body particularly, but also with forgotten ways of knowing 
The writing of Helene Cixous is interesting because of her focus on language and 
metaphor, she "notes the generalized loss of the world resulting from the constrictive 
practice of language, from which she excludes herself' (Conley 1993, p79). Cixous 
hopes to reclaim "a natural language" through writing that turns oppositions into 
differences: "Presently in the Occident ... , differences are turned by reigning ideologies 
into oppositions and hierarchies. These she sets out to expose and undo through a 
medium that privileges writing 'as' metaphor and 'more than' metaphor since it 
replaces nothing"(Conley 1997, p12S). By so doing she aims to retrieve a non-
oppositional language. 
Focusing, like lrigaray, on the suppression of the maternal in the restrictions of this 
language, Cixous understands the body to be lost along with "natural" language. In 
her examination of Freudian psychoanalysis, Cixous sees "The masculine subject 
asserts himself through negation of the other. He spirals towards the spirit and leaves 
the body (that is, nature) behind. The world of 'natural' language, closer to body and 
affect, is lost. From there on, a phallocentric, martial culture puts everything under the 
sign of grammar and repression ... " (Conley 1997, P 125). Cixous hopes to resist this 
linguistic repression by a writing that disrupts the oppositional, this approach is 
informed by an understanding of technology as contributing to the separation of 
language from the body: 
Cixous proposes another type of knowing, an active conditio~ where the division 
between body and intellect (language) and between nature and culture are not 
clearly drawn. The separation between subject and object - here the maternal body 
and nature - hinges on language. Historically, this loss, beginning with the advent 
of modem science, is fancied to come about with writing and the printing press, 
with the shift that communication depended on voice and the body to mental 
abstraction involved with decipherment of symbolic characters. (Conley 1997, 
p126). 
Again the printing press is cited as instrumental in changing understandings of the 
body. In the second chapter the spatiality of the printing press was closely aligned 
with new concepts of the spatiality of the body and location of the subject, Cixous 
understands it as contributing to the dislocation of the body from language. The body 
is displaced by the word, and at the same time, in Foucault's analysis, the word is 
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separated from meaning. A key aspect to this project is an examination of the 
connections between technologies of communication, or the mediums of languaae and 
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subject location and corporeal experience. A recognition of the key nature of printing 
technology in the dispersal of the language of the Enlightenment, with the associated 
separation of corporeality from knowing, supports the relevance of reading new 
communication technologies as facilitating of new subjectivities and understandinas of 
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corporeality. Indeed, the virtual world, which has been opened up by contemporary 
technology, encourages the imaginary element and facilitates new realms of 
imagination, aspects of expression which Cixous sees as restricted by technology. 
Conley takes a critical view of Cixous' belief that she can exempt herself from 
inclusion within this repressive language, but is particularly critical of her 
antitechnological standpoint, 
By refusing to deal with technology in terms other than the process of 'writing' or 
'representation', she wilfully decides not to look at many of the interconnections of the 
contemporary world... For feminists, like Cixous, the world of things, or nature, is lost 
through symbolic language and grammar. To let things speak, we have to recourse to 
presymbolic language. (Conley 1993, p80) 
Cixous' route back to the body by a return to a presymbolic language is, it is argued 
here, not possible. Rather, new metaphors and frameworks, facilitated by technology, 
may actually permit a new expression of the body, one in which the oppositions, 
understood by Cixous and others, as so damaging, may be superseded or lose 
relevance. As mentioned in the first chapter, Sadie Plant (1996) says even Irigaray 
could not envisage a route out of the restrictions of language but that in the 
development of technology a language is forming in which the interconnections of the 
contemporary world can be expressed. 
An indication of the conceptual distance that has been travelled from the pre-modem 
to the postmodem era and the transformations in language intrinsic to this process, can 
be found in the work of Benedict Anderson. Anderson analyses Sacred languages and 
the essential part they played in religious and dynastic communities. The cultural gap 
that he evokes illustrates the impossibility of a return to a presymbolic language. 
Anderson identifies the decline of these Sacred languages with the onset of commercial 
printing, the effect of which was the decline of religious and dynastic community and 
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the beginning of national identity (Anderson 1991). He locates a pure written 
language, unmediated, non-referential, where each symbol represents one thing, that 
has a purity of meaning. This is the clean unambiguous language which deconstructive 
theory aims to but can never know . 
.. : written Arabic functioned like Chinese characters to create a community out of 
SIgns, not sounds C··) All the great Classical communities conceived of themselves 
as cosmically central, through the medium of a sacred language linked to a 
superterrestial order of power. .. (In fact the deader the written language - the farther 
it was from speech - the better: in principle everyone has access to a pure world of... 
signs). (Anderson 1991, p20). 
For Anderson it is the rise of global communication, starting with commercial printing 
that has driven a "harsh wedge between cosmology and history" (Anderson 1991, 40). 
Communication trades in language, is the mediator of signs, so as communication 
increased, particularly between cultures, the exchange of signs takes on its own 
momentum, removing them further and further from their original simplicity of 
meamng: 
if the sacred silent languages were the media through which the great global 
communities of the past were imagined, the reality of such apparitions depended on 
an idea largely foreign to the contemporary Western mind: the non-arbitrariness of 
signs. The ideograms of Chinese, Latin, or Arabic were emanations of reality, not 
randomly fabricated representations of it... Until quite recently, the Qur' an was 
literally untranslatable C .. ) Because Allah's truth was accessible only through the 
unsubstitutable true signs of written Arabic. (Anderson 1991, p21). 
This must of course be understood alongside the increased speed with which this new 
way of "thinking the world" could be disseminated once technology had enabled print 
capitalism. Prior to the advent of print capitalism the individual concerns of the 
scientist were not easily communicated in a wider arena, so, for example, growing 
evidence of inaccuracies in Ptolemaic's astronomical theories took centuries to be 
consensually recognised: "Because the astronomical tradition was repeatedly 
interrupted from the outside and because, in the absence of printing, communication 
between astronomers was restricted, these difficulties were only slowly recognised" 
(Kuhn 1970, p68-69). 
Such a leap in comprehension that is necessary to imagine a non-exchangeable 
symbolic language, a truth language, is required to comprehend the universal shift in 
thinking that occurred in these periods. Anderson is careful to point out that the 
decline of religious community and the assent of nationalism happened within a climate 
that was ready, for, conducive to this change. He sees the explorations of the "new" 
world and the cultural and geographic expansion that these incurred, as the first to 
effect shifts in thinking. He says, "Beneath the decline of sacred communities , 
languages and lineages, a fundamental change was taking place in modes of 
apprehending the world, which more than anything else, made it possible to 'think' the 
nation" (Anderson 1983, p28). This receptivity, readiness for change, can be seen 
thoughout all religious, political, philosophical and scientific developments in the West. 
In concentrating on language, the socio-economic forces and their effects upon the 
individual's notion of self, of community and of location, the changes that interest 
Anderson, have been sidelined. These forces are examined in the first chapter in 
relationship with the current effects of global forces and technology on senses of 
location and identity. 
In any revolutionary process something is gained as something is lost, and it seems that 
in this case the significant alterations are primarily linguistic, to do with having 
adequate language to describe the world and the feeling of being in the world. As a 
useful new tool for understanding the world, science categorised the natural world and 
in doing so, interconnected, corporeal, "unscientific" understandings were invalidated, 
precisely because science held a relationship to reason and 'truth' .(2) 
As we can see from Stepan the relationship of science to truth was achieved 
metaphorically, linguistically, and the inadequacy of this language to explain our 
contemporary experience of the world serves to reveal the limitations of classical 
scientific discourse. It has been shown that new metaphors, new models for 
description and new forms of language are being tried for size: the body as an interface 
is an example of a dominant metaphor for theoretical interpretations of the self s 
(2) It must be said that although scientific discourse dominates this peri.od ~ere are examples of .. 
discourses that are resistant to an over emphasis on reason and mechanisa?on, the poetry and wntmg 
of the Romantics would be an example, or the work of William Blake (17) 7 -182 7), another. 
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interaction with culture via the body - precisely because it uses a contemporary model 
of thinking. If we look at the new languages, for example, e-mail, text messaging, the 
language of asianlbritish!carribeanlafrican people in the cities - the characteristic and 
appeal of, the relevance of these languages lies in their constantly evolving, cross-
cultural nature. In these languages the overlaying of one meaning with another is 
intrinsic and explicit. The appeal and relevance of the language of natural history, 
classification through the markation of difference, was that it placed an order upon an 
unruly proliferation of new information, and the particular use of metaphor served to 
define and validate a new system of knowing in a turbulent world. 
Before proceeding to look at the discoveries of the twentieth century and beyond, 
where it is possible to identify, not a return to, but an emergence of theories and 
approaches that might indicate a renewal of certain aspects of the world, the following 
section will look at the power and authority of classical science, its systems and 
language. 
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3.3 CLASSICAL SCIENCE 
The reliance of the development of Natural History on categorisation and a splitting of 
language has been illustrated, in the late seventeenth century Newton's laws of motion 
and of gravity were accepted as a real model of the way the universe worked and 
classical science was born. Thomas Kuhn argues that prior to Newton there were 
competing schools of thought, where there were no commonly accepted theories and 
so no basis form which to work, but rather a variety of explanations with no 
consensual basis. According to Kuhn, there have been "successive transition [ s] from 
one paradigm to another via revolution" (Kuhn 1962, p 12) where a paradigm is 
defined as a theory or group of theories that is accepted as a factual basis by the 
scientific community. Kuhn says that without paradigm there is no science, here it is 
suggested rather that without paradigms, there is no classical science. 
The period in which Newton's laws of motion and gravity, which showed the world to 
be constant and predictable, were accepted as a basis for scientific endeavour, is 
identifiable as the time at which one way of knowing the world was finally rejected in 
favour of another. This altered world view was not because of science, nor is science 
the only manifestation of this altered perspective, but the power of science to speak of 
this altered world and the privileged relationship to truth that it came to hold means 
that classical science is representative of the modem approach to knowledge. The 
appropriateness of science to speak for a mechanised culture, Alvin T offier argues, is a 
large part of the reason that Newton's theories were taken up so readily, for they were 
based in a world where "initial conditions that were at least in principle, determinable 
with precision. It was a world in which chance played no part, in which all the pieces 
came together like cogs in a cosmic machine" (Tomer 1984, xii). Science, in part, 
succeeded because it corresponded with dominant understandings of the way the world 
should be expected to operate, in this case the machine, it also entered the arena at a 
time when religion had lost the authority to speak of all aspects of the world. T oiller 
places the acceptance of Newton's laws firmly within a particular socio-economic 
climate: 
The Newtonian system arose at a time when feudalism in Western Europe was 
crumbling - wh~n the social system was, so to speak, far from equilibrium. The 
mo~el ~f the umver~ proposed by the classical scientists (even if partially 
~envatIve) was a~ph~ analogously to new fields and disseminated successfully, not 
~ust be~ause o~ SCIentific power or <rightness', but also because an emergent -
llld~stnal socIety. based on revolutionary principles provided a particularly receptive 
enVlronme~t for It.;. It still ~~s ~nse to me to regard the Newtonian knowledge 
system as, Itself, a cultural dISSIpatIve structure' born of social fluctuation. (ToIDer 
1984, xxv/xxvi). 
F or the first time a set of laws were agreed upon as the basis for scientific endeavour , 
Newton presented theories with associated laws and methods of application, and the 
scientific community agreed with him - this is what Kuhn calls a paradigm. According 
to Kuhn it is the consensual paradigm that distinguishes science from other disciplines, 
and science achieves a high status largely due to the relationship to truth that the 
consensual paradigm would seem to achieve and, Kuhn argues, due to "the detailed, 
esoteric" work that an established foundation allows. Paradigms will succeed, as 
Newton's did, because they are "sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring 
group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity. Simultaneously 
[they are] sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group 
of practitioners to resolve" (Kuhn 1962, p 1 0). This is the arena of what Kuhn calls 
"normal science", research based on an accepted paradigm where the role of the 
scientist is to illustrate the paradigm in more detail, or with increased accuracy or in 
new applications. Normal science is not looking for the unexpected but rather aiming 
to achieve a result already defined by the paradigm. So normal science is the 
"mopping up" of a paradigm, ''No part of the aim of normal science is to call forth new 
sorts of phenomena .... Nor do scientists normally aim to invent new theories ... Instead 
normal scientific research is directed to the articulation of those phenomena and 
theories that the paradigm already supplies" (Kuhn 1962, p23). Kuhn equates normal 
science with a jigsaw puzzle, there are rules that must be followed and there is a set 
outcome, an assumed solution. The aim is to meet the prediction based on the 
paradigm by following the rules pertaining to the paradigm, or to develop new 
equipment to allow even better fitting results. The problem, although Kuhn tends to 
see this as a characteristic rather than a problem, with this sort of scientific activity is 
that, if an ill-fitting piece appears it will often be discarded as wTong: the choice is 
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either this or to reject the puzzle - the paradigm - as wrong. So ill-fitting research will 
be perceived as a failure on the part of the scientist rather than the paradigm itself 
So "normal science" is research founded on established paradigms, indeed Kuhn goes 
so far as to say that "There is no such thing as research in the absence of any 
paradigms" and that "To reject a paradigm without simultaneously substituting another 
is to reject science itself' (Kuhn 1962, p79). 
However the historian of science knows that there have been revolutions, processes by 
which a paradigm is replaced by another. Such a process and the activities around 
such a process is what Kuhn calls "extraordinary science". In the processes of "normal 
science", anomalies or inconsistencies may be dismissed or put aside in the belief that 
improved methods of application will show a way to fit these pieces into the puzzle, so 
far as possible inconsistencies will be accommodated. However if an anomaly has 
persisted and is generally recognised as problematic, increasing attention will be paid 
to it by increasingly eminent scientists and "many of them may come to view its 
resolution as the subject matter of their discipline" (Kuhn 1962, p83, original 
emphasis). With increased attention and varied attempts to accommodate anomaly, "A 
proliferation of versions of a theory" will abound which "is a very usual symptom of a 
crisis" (Kuhn 1962, p70). "Through this proliferation of divergent articulations ( ... ), 
the rules of normal science become increasingly blurred. Though there is still a 
paradigm, few practitioners prove to be entirely agreed about what it is ... " (Kuhn 
1962, p83). So, if there are persistent unresolved anomalies, and many minor 
alterations are made to a paradigm the rules for "normal research" are "loosened". 
Kuhn identifies three possible outcomes of such a situation, where either: 
... normal science ultimately proves able to handle the crisis-provoking problem 
despite the despair of those who have seen it as the end of an existing paradigm. On 
other occasions the problem resists even apparently radical new approaches. Then 
scientists may concluded that no solution will be forthcoming in the present state of 
their field. The problem is labelled and set aside for a future generation \~th more 
developed tools. Or ... a crisis may end with the emergence of a new candidate for a 
paradigm and with the ensuing battle for its acceptance. (Kuhn 1962, p83). 
Now, there will be a period of overlap between the old and ne\v paradigms where 
some problems are resolved by each but once the transition is complete there will be a 
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whole new framework within which to handle date, what Kuhn calls "picking up the 
other end of the stick" (Kuhn 1962, p8). Paradigm shifts such as this offer a whole 
new way of viewing the world, a new perspective from which there is no going back, 
indeed " ... the historian of science may be tempted to exclaim that when paradigms 
change, the world itself changes with them" (Kuhn 1962, pIll). In this extraordinary 
process, in the early stages of which scientists are almost randomly searchina makina 
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speculation and trying them out, philosophy has a role and a debate over fundamentals 
once again occurs, whereas in the activity of "normal science" such questions are off 
limits. Kuhn argues that it is often the young or those new to a field, those with a 
different perspective, who will identify anomaly as counter instance and be 
instrumental in initiating a period of "extraordinary science". 
The processes of "extraordinary science" expose the truth claims of science and, as 
Kuhn concurs, reveal the subjectivity of the scientist. However, the processes of 
"normal science" serve to obscure these realisations primarily through the revisionist 
nature of text books. For, once a new paradigm is accepted, science resumes normal 
activity and central to this process is the rewriting of textbooks. With the acceptance 
of a paradigm the role of the scientist is not to reassert the basis laws but to 
substantiate these laws in further detail or new applications, the job of explaining the 
paradigm, its basic rules and methods, to the student or layman, falls to the textbook. 
So after a paradigm shift the textbooks need to be rewritten and in this process 
textbooks "inevitably disguise not only the role but the very existence of the 
revolutions that produced them. Textbooks then begin by truncating the scientist's 
sense of his discipline's history and then proceed to supply a substitute for what they 
have eliminated" (Kuhn 1962, pI37). It is by this process, which is made possible by 
the technologies of print capitalism, that science appears as cumulative, revolutions are 
rendered invisible and it is not made clear that the questions of today are not the same 
as the questions of yesterday. In this way science is presented as a linear progression 
toward truth and the subjective element is underplayed, and importantly, by not 
dwelling on those previous paradigms that were once accepted as fact - as science-
but have since been proved wrong, normal science validates its relationship to "fact" or 
"truth". 
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Kuhn's analysis is interesting on many levels and, if accepted, lays out conditions by 
which to identify periods of crisis - a profusion of different theories, the asking of 
bigger, philosophical questions - which could prove useful in showing the 
contemporary period to be one that has entered revolution, yet his analysis is also open 
to criticism. A critical take on Kuhn, rather than restricting the impact of his theory, 
actually allows a good insight into what Newtonian or classical science represented 
and aimed to achieve. For when Kuhn says that without the consensual paradigm there 
is no science, he shows himself to be speaking of only one aspect of scientific activity, 
it is suggested here that when Kuhn says science, he actually means classical science, a 
closed, introspective science that is not characteristic either of scientific activity before 
Newton, or perhaps typical of all aspects of contemporary science. 
So although Kuhn is critical, as a historian of science, of the revisionary nature of 
textbooks, and while he recognises the conservative nature of "normal science" where 
"Perhaps the most striking feature of the normal research problems ... is how little they 
aim to produce major novelties" (Kuhn 1962, p35). He is able to accept such a 
situation because he views it as enabling of "progress". He understands the crises that 
develop out of "normal science" as bringing about a progressive revolutionary change 
internally, he does not see such changes as being part of a larger cultural or social 
picture but as intrinsic to the nature of "normal" scientific activity. While agreeing that 
external factors may affect the timing of the acceptance of a paradigm shift he does not 
view these as causal influences. In his opinion it is the very removal of the researcher 
from the distractions of the outside world that allows him or her success. Kuhn's 
perspective is firmly sited within traditional science, for example, by not expanding on 
the cultural environment within which Newton's theories were taken up as science, he 
is, it could be argued taking a very classically scientific view of what science is. 
A useful aspect of Kuhn's analysis, is the idea that accordant with a paradigm shift is 
an irreversible change in the way the world is viewed, however his reluctance to 
expand on the cultural and social influences upon science rather limits the depth of this 
insight. Is it not more likely that the reason a paradigm shift occurs is because the 
world itselfis changing, or is ready for change? He views this as a unidirectional shift 
science changes the world view, rather than an interaction: science operates as part of 
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the world view. In a contemporary context but in direct criticism ofKu~ Prigogine 
and Stengers ask: 
how ~ we co~ider as accidental that the rediscovery of time in physics is 
occumng at a tIme of extreme acceleration in human history? Cultural context 
cannot be the complete answer, but it cannot be denied either. We have to 
incorporate the complex relations between 'internal' and 'external' determinations 
of the production of scientific concepts. (Prigogine and Stengers 1984, p309). 
They would agree that the science Kuhn speaks of as if it were all science, is only an 
aspect of what science is: 
Scientific activity best corresponds to Kuhn's view when it is considered in the 
context of the contemporary university, in which research and the training of future 
researchers is combined. Kuhn's analysis, if it is taken as a description of science in 
general, leading to conclusions about what knowledge must be, can be reduced to a 
new psychosocial version of the positivist conception of scientific development 
namely, the tendency to increasing specialization and compartmentalization: the 
identification of 'normal' scientific behaviour with that of the 'serious', 'silent' 
researcher who wastes no time on 'general' questions about the overall significance 
of his research but sticks to specialized problems: and the essential independence of 
scientific developments from cultural, economic, and social problems. (prigogine 
and Stengers 1984, p307). 
Prigogine and Stengers disagree with Kuhn's assertion that the driving force of science 
is its conservative nature, rather than seeing scientific transformation as a crisis, after 
which, once a new language has been found, science settles back down to 
unquestioning acceptance of paradigms, they choose to focus on the continuities, these 
may not be immediately apparent, but although hidden, still continuities. Kuhn 
explains the fact that a discovery will often be made by a number of scientists at the 
same time as a tribute to the effectiveness of science as an evolutionary system: "The 
very fact that a significant scientific novelty so often emerges simultaneously from 
several laboratories is an index both to the strongly traditional nature of normal science 
and to the completeness with which that traditional pursuit prepares the way for its 
own change" (Kuhn 1962, p65). He fails to address the fact that scientists work as 
part of a social, cultural and economic environment which affects the questions they 
ask. 
In relation to Kuhn's analysis, three interpretations of contemporary science can be 
made. When Prigogine and Stengers assert: 
The past one hundred years have been marked by sev~ral crises that co~n~ 
closely to the description given by Kuhn - none of which were S?ught b) SCH.:ntIsts. 
Examples are the discovery of the instability of elementary partIcles, or of the 
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ev~lving universe. However, the recent history of science is also characterized bv a 
sene~ of ~roblems that are the consequences of deliberate and lucid questions asked 
by sClenhsts wh~ kn~w that the questions had both scientific and philosophical 
aspects. Thus sClenhsts are not doomed to behave like 'hypnon'! (prigogine and 
Stengers 1984, p309, original emphasis). 
This might mean, as above, that Kuhn's analysis is applicable only to certain aspects of 
scientific activity, particularly teaching, or it might mean, as already suggested, that the 
sort of science that Kuhn speaks of is classical science and that contemporary science 
in some way differs to this - has changed, or it might mean that Kuhn's analysis is 
entirely correct but that we are in a period of "extraordinary science" where scientists 
are asking questions, philosophical questions and looking at the larger picture. 
Prigogine and Stengers assert that Newtonian models are still useful and important but 
they are usefully applicable to closed systems where chance does not have a role; 
"traditional science in the Age of the Machine tended to emphasise stability, order, 
uniformity and equilibrium", their book aims to show "how the still valid, though much 
limited claims ofNewtonianism might fit compatibly into a larger scientific image of 
reality. It argues that the old 'universal' laws are not universal at all, but apply only to 
local regions of reality. And these happen to be the regions to which science has 
devoted the most effort" (Tomer 1984, xiv). It is argued here that such an analysis is 
also applicable to Kuhn's interpretation of the operations of science; that it is useful in 
thinking about aspects of scientific activity, but that it is grounded within a traditional 
idea of science, and that contemporary science in some way differs to this. Indeed, 
Stephen Hawking says that a classical theory is one that "does not take account of the 
uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics ... " (Hawking 1988, p60-61) showing 
contemporary science to have a different theoretical basis to that of classical science, 
and Kuhn himself does not take account of the uncertainty principle. 
Another theme of Kuhn's work which is compatible with the philosophy of classical 
science, is that of the scientist as operating most successfully when removed from the 
distractions of the everyday world. Since Plato there has been the idea that emotions 
are a hindrance to knowing, and this certainly would concur with Kuhn's idea, for 
although he understands the subjectivity of the scientist, indeed offers an insight into 
80 
this, he regrets the futility of returning to a "realm in which experience is again stable 
for once and for all" (Kuhn 1962, p125): 
But is sensory e~erience fixed and neutral? .. The epistemological viewpoint that 
has m~st often gwded Western Philosophy for three centuries dictates an immediate 
an .eqUI:'OCal, -: es! I~ th~ absence of a developed alternative, I find it impossible to 
relInqUIsh entIrely ~s Viewpoint. Yet it is no longer functions effectively, and 
theatte~pts to make It do so through the introduction of a neutral language of 
observatlons now seem to me to be hopeless. (Kuhn 1962, pI25). 
Kuhn explains that paradigms define the way the world is perceived, it seems as well as 
the various paradigms that operate as science, there are laws and methods that pertain 
to science as a discipline. One of the tenets of classical science is a belief in scientific 
objectivity as diametrically opposed to the non-rational and the subjective - that which 
is not science. The recognition of the subjective nature of science and the appearance 
of brilliant science form Einstein, who "put the observer back in the system" (Tomer 
1984, xiv) has somewhat altered this situation. The laws of classical science are based 
on the constancy of time; "With the rise of modernity time faced another split; between 
historical time and scientific time. With the development of precise clocks, time 
became a scientific concept which could be defined independent of the stars and 
planets. Newton's mechanistic, linear, context-independent concept of time became 
the foundation of all science until Einstein's theory of relativity in a way restored the 
mystical conception of the continuity between space and time" (Heller 1996, p79). 
It is then possible to identify a distinction between the underlying themes of classical 
science, primarily constancy and stability, and the basics of twentieth century science, 
where largely due to Einstein the world has come to viewed as fundamentally 
unpredictable and changing, and central to this is the concept of time as relative and as 
non-reversible. 
The quest of classical science is in itself an illustration of the dichotomy ~at runs 
throughout the history of Western thought. Only the i~utab~e .world of Ideas w~s 
traditionally recognized as 'illuminated by the sun of the mtelligtble to ~ ~lato s 
expression. In the same sense, only eternal laws were ~een. to expr~s. SCIentific 
rationality. Temporality was looked down upon as an 111U.SI?~ .. This IS no l?~ger 
true today ... We find ourselves in a world in which reversibIltty and determmlsm 
apply only to limiting, simple causes, while irreversibility and randomness are the 
rules. (Prigogone and Stengers 1984 p7-8). 
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4.4 CONCLUSION. 
This chapter has shown the ways in which spatial tools and methods have been 
employed to describe a newly spatial world. In this process the body has been 
displaced by the word and truth and knowledge have become associated with vision 
and objectivity. These can be understood as an expansion of the practices that were 
outlined in Chapter Two as emerging in the period of the Enlightenment, a period of 
spatial transfonnation. 
The subject of this project is the body, the corporeal sensual living here and now body, 
however this chapter has been primarily about language and has aimed to illustrate the 
dominance language has come to have in our expression and understanding of the 
corporeal body, we have no recourse to an alternative explanation, which is why the 
limits of language in terms of its models and words, are so definitive of the limits 
within which we can articulate experience. Although Freud talks of a residual 
'Oceanic' feeling (Freud 1957), and Cixous claims to rememberlknow an experience 
prior to the restrictions of language, the tenns within which any such experience can be 
articulated is once again delimited by contemporary language, it turns out that the 
future has provided a technology in which these ways of knowing the world are at 
home. It is suggested here that a more promising route to expression of corporeal 
experience can be found by looking at the new models and metaphors shown to us by 
new science and technologies, this will be one of the aims of the following two 
chapters. However, science and technology not only offer new models, it will also be 
shown that they are instrumental in changing our knowledge of space and time and 
our experience of space and time. So as well as offering the possibility of a new 
language to describe our corporeal experience, science and technology also facilitates a 
new spatial and temporal experience which requires description and articulation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TWENTIETH CENTURY SCIENCE. 
I re~ember someone at one of our parties talking about particallwave duality. After 
a while Jakob said: 'Perhaps it's just that when light is up against the wall it' s 
forced to choose.' Everyone laughed, listen to the layman talk about physics! But I 
knew what Jakob ~eant... ~hen Jakob said; 'Perhaps the electron is neither particle 
or wave but something else mstead, much less simple - a dissonance - like grief ... ' . 
(Michaels 1998, p211). 
4.1 INTRODUCTION. 
The last chapter took a route through language and metaphor to illustrate the power of 
scientific discourse on understandings of the body; this section will develop some of 
those ideas by showing that new science demands new models for imagining the world. 
It will also reintroduce the dominant theme of the second chapter, that a period of 
transfonnation in systems of knowledge can be triggered by spatial and temporal 
alterations. Contemporary science will be shown to be significantly different from 
classical science, and an essential feature of this distinction will be seen to be an altered 
conception of space and time. Showing the contemporary period to be defined by 
altered parameters of space and time is a primary indication that we have again entered 
a period of intense transfonnation, and it is suggested that alterations to 
understandings of the body will be intrinsic to this. 
A fundamental shift in science, would itself be evidence of new input into our system 
of knowledge but also contemporary models of science are shown to require a new 
level of imagination in order to be believed or understood; they cannot be visually 
confinned like the models of classical science. It has been demonstrated that the 
visual association with knowledge contributed to the severance of body and mind 
which was completed by Cartesian philosophy (see p66); how might an altered sensory 
definition of knowledge impact understandings of body and mind') Oral culture is 
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suited to an understanding of time as process, visual culture describes an extended now 
and makes a claim to atemporality and so objectivity. (Keller and Grontkowski 1996 , 
p200) Twentieth century science however is revealing to us new spatial and temporal 
perspectives which appear to require more imaginative! conceptual tools for 
explanation. As Stephen Hawking says: "It is impossible to imagine a four-
dimensional space. I personally find it hard enough to visualize a three-dimensional 
space!" (Hawking 1988, p24). Similarly, attempting to imagine quantum activity or 
wave particle duality or the expanse of the universe demands that you suspend belief 
and actually try not to visualize the concept. Twentieth century science tells us that 
things operate differently at a very small or large scale so, from a human perspective, 
which falls in the middle between the smallest and the largest - both in terms of our 
size and in terms of the age of humanity - these phenomenon cannot be viewed. 
Instead we rely increasingly on analogies, partial analogies; because we can not fully 
imagine, for example, quantum activity - there is nothing like it that we can see with 
our eyes - we can only say that aspects of quantum phenomena might, sometimes, be 
comparable to a model we already have. 
Everything in science is about models and predictions, about finding ways to get a 
picture in your head about how the universe works, ... The further we get from the 
ordinary world of everyday life, whether towards the very small scale or towards the 
very large scale, the more we have to rely on analogies: an atom is. under certain 
circumstances, 'like' a billiard ball; a black hole is, in some sense, 'like' a dent in a 
trampoline. (Gribbin 1998, p7). 
In this sense understandings of contemporary science are limited by the 
appropriateness of available analogies. This has been explored in the first chapter 
where technologies of communication and the processes of globalisation were 
examined, for new technologies are a prime source for new analogies; the power of 
cartography in the development of a language for Enlightenment thinking and the 
mechanistic understandings of the world in Classical Science have already testified to 
this. Contemporary science is differentiated from Classical science in that its models 
are not presented as real or complete, but as models: "Even if it does agree with 
experiment, that does not mean that a model is 'right' in the sense of being some 
eternal, universal Deep Truth about the nature of things being studied" (Gribbin 1998, 
p5). 
This chapter will work towards an understanding of the challenges to our conception 
of space and time, and so of our place in the world, that are presented to us by 
contemporary science. In so doing a marked departure from the parameters of 
Enlightenment and classical scientific discourse will be identified. When Kuhn explains 
the paradigm in science he is usually referring to quite specific aspects of science, and 
often a paradigm shift will only affect a group of interested people, but he also 
identifies paradigm shifts that have had led to a common change in world view. 
In its extrascientific consequences ... , the Copernican theory is not typical: few 
scientific theories have played so large a role in non-scientific thought. But neither 
is it unique. In the nineteenth century Darwin's theory of evolution raised similar 
extrascientific questions. In our own century, Einstein's relativity theories and 
Freud's psychoanalytical theories provide centers for controversies from which may 
emerge further radical reorientations of West em thought. (Kuhn 1957, p4). 
Copernicus (see p60) and psychoanalysis (see p69/70) are referred to elsewhere, the 
changes that interest this section begin with Einstein and proceed to outline, at a 
layman's level, the developments and implications of his theories in order to work 
toward an explanation of what is different about contemporary understandings of 
space and time. 
4.2 EINSTEIN AND BEYOND. 
Einstein (1879 - 1955) was prolific and influential in many fields but his main theories 
might be summarised as these: a mathematical explanation for Brownian movement of 
molecules, an explanation of photoelectric activity - photons, the theory of relativity 
and the relation of mass to energy. The development of these has led to the most 
important realisations of the twentieth century: quantum theory, an expanding, 
entropic universe and the irreversibility of time, none of which Einstein was able to 
fully accept. Einstein's personal responses to these developments are worth including 
in this initial explanation; resonant with those of Copernicus, the conflicts that Einstein 
85 
experienced between science and belief are illustrative of the antagonisms between old 
and new world views. 
The theory of relativity is often illustrated by imagining the expanding surface of a 
balloon as it is blown up. I am reliant here on Gribbin's (1998) clarity of explanation. 
Imagine the balloon's surface is covered with paint spots, each spot representative of a 
galaxy, as the balloon expands the spots become further apart, 
not because the paint is moving across the surface of the balloon, but because the 
skin of the balloon (space-time) is stretching, ... If the balloon expands so that the 
distance between two neighbouring spots doubles in size, then the distance between 
every pair of spots doubles in size. Choosing any spot on the balloon to measure 
from, a spot that was 1 cm away will now be 2 em away (seeming to have moved by 
1 cm), a spot that was 2 cm away will now be 4 cm away (seeming to have moved 
twice as fast), and so on. The further away a spot is the faster it will seem to be 
moving ... (Gribbin 1998, p236, original emphasis). 
This explanation, like Darwinian evolution, is, once pointed out, easy enough to 
understand, indeed appears immediately to make sense, however to conceive of such a 
theory requires a leap of imagination, an extraordinary mind. The implications of this 
theory on accepted notions of time and space are multiple. The experience of the 
expanding balloon demands a located observer so leading to a concept of time as 
subjective, but it is also this theory that allows us to understand the universe as 
expanding and so, as having had a beginning - for if the expansion is run in reverse, 
"the entire visible universe must have emerged from a mathematical point - a 
singularity - at a definite time in the past" (Gribbin 1998, p236). The theory of 
relativity also shows that there is no centre to the universe, nor an external vantage 
point from which the universe can be viewed, which rather undermines the classical 
conception of the centrality and authority of humanity, and the theory also tell us that 
time is not reversible: if the universe has emerged from a singularity and has since been 
expanding, and is entropic - losing energy, the arrow of time points forward only. 
This idea alongside quantum theory, which tells us that the activity and timing of 
future events cannot be accurately predicted, describes a world that is fundamentally 
disordered and random, concepts in opposition to the tenets of classical science 
Together these ideas, which will be discussed below, contribute to alterations of scale 
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as dramatic as those of the Enlightenment but this tlll1° e the alt to 
era IOns are temporal as 
well as spatial. 
Firstly then, the implications of time as subjective to the located observer will be 
examined. Einstein definitively separated the realm of the scientist from that of dreary 
everyday life, concurring with Kuhn's view that a scientist operates most successfully 
when removed from mundane distractions: '" ... one of the strongest motives that lead 
men to art and science is flight from everyday life with its painful harshness and 
wretched dreariness, and from the fetters of one's own shifting desires. A person v. ith 
a finer sensibility is driven to escape from personal existence and to the world of 
objective observing and understanding" (Einstein 1918 cited in Prigogine and Stengers 
1984, p20). However, in the theory of relativity an observation demands a located 
individual to observe it. This is because, unlike the theories of Newton, which 
... did not assume that the observer was a 'physical being.' Objective description was 
defined precisely as the absence of any reference to its author", the theory of relathi ty. 
which is "based on a constraint that applies only to physically localized. observers. to 
beings who can be in only one place at a time and not everywhere at once, gives this 
physics a 'human' quality. (Prigogine and Stengers 1984, p218). 
In this way the scientist is relocated in the ordinary world. 
General relativity explains space/time as curved, and time as slowed down near a 
massive body like the earth (Hawking 1988, p32), the acceptance of this demands the 
abandonment of the idea of absolute time. (1) 
Newton's laws of motion put an end to the idea of absolute position in space. The theory ofrelati\ ity 
gets rid of absolute time. Consider a pair of nvins. Suppose that one n,in goes to live on the top of a 
mountain while the other stays at sea level. The first twin would age faster than the second. Thus, if 
they met again, one would be older than the other. In this case, the difference in ages would be very 
(1) It is exceptionally difficult for Westerner's to abandon the idea of absolute time and so to 
overcome the paradox. For other cultures there is no paradox, as Ardener su~gests. by using Sarah 
Skar's work which gives a: " fascinating example of a whole popular culture m which no clear 
boundary is placed between abstract time and space. Among the Matapuquio of Peru one te~ 
(pacha) is employed to embrace both concepts ... In the practical daily world of the ~latapuqwo, the 
intertwining of space and time is exemplified by the difference benveen the top~ of the rnoun~ms 
where crops take a long time to mature, and the lower slopes ~'~ere the ~~?on of plants IS .;; 
quicker. The passage of time and the place of space are thus llltunately hnked (Ardener 1993, p 1_ ) 
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small, but it would be much larger if one of the twins went ~or a Ion tn' . hi 
. 1~ g P III a spaces p at 
nearly the speed of ~g~t. When he returned, he would be much younger than the one who 
~yed on Earth .. This IS known as the twins paradox, but it is a paradox only if one has the 
Idea of absolute tIme at the back of one's mind In the theory of rei tI' 'ty th· . 
. . . ... a VI ere IS no umque 
absolute tIme: but mstead ~ch m~VIdual has his own personal measure of time that depends 
on where he IS and how he IS mOVing. (Hawking 1988, p33). 
The next challenge presented by the theory of relativity is that, if developed, it explains 
the universe as expanding which, when taken alongside the uncertainty principle, 
(which will be explained in relation to quantum theory below), might seem to describe 
our universe as fundamentally random and chaotic. 
The uncertainty principle had profound implications for the way in which we view the 
world. Even after more than fifty years they have not been fully appreciated by many 
philosophers, ... The uncertainty principle signalled an end to Laplace's (2) dream of a 
theory of science, a model of the universe that would be completely deterministic: one 
certainly cannot predict future events exactly if one cannot even measure the present 
state of the universe exactly. (Hawking 1984, p55). 
Newton had believed that a divinely constructed universe would be fundamentally 
stable and unchanging, and "Although it was out of fashion from the mid 19th century 
onwards to include God in scientific statements, the feeling that there was something 
sublimely rational and sacred about an unchanging universe ... had by no means 
disappeared" (Ferguson 1999, pI83). So when theories of an expanding universe were 
proposed many, including Einstein himself, were resistant to the idea. Twentieth 
century science had relinquished the idea of a created universe, however a universe that 
had a beginning also seemed to require a creator (Ferguson 1999, pI83). But 
Einstein's reservations seem to be art of a more traditional Scientific belief in 
constancy: his theories are by Hawking's definition classical, in that they do "not take 
account of the uncertainty principle" (Hawking 1988, p60). Einstein said that "To 
admit to such a possibility seems senseless" (Ferguson 1999, p184) and to counter this 
possibility, he conceived of a "cosmological constant" which limited his theory so as to 
render the universe unchanging, this he was later to call "the biggest blunder of my 
life" (Ferguson 1999, P 184). 
(2) Pierre Laplace, (1749-1827) was a French mathematician and astronomer who \~as intcrest~ In 
perturbations in gravitational fields these, he concluded, were negligible. thus assertIng the stabIlity 
and permanence of the solar system. 
88 
As mentioned above, the located observer in an expanding universe has no external 
vantage point by which to gain a complete, objective view. Ferguson argues that the 
only way in which we can see an edge of the universe or perceive the universe in 
entirety is by looking backwards: "Paradoxically, living in an expanding universe 
means that there is a direction in which we can peer and see something different, 
perhaps even see an 'edge'. That direction is the past. What's more, in any space 
direction we look, we look towards the origin of the universe, for any direction is 
towards the past" (Ferguson 1999, p187-188, original emphasis). This idea will be 
picked up later when it is argued that although at first these theories might seem to 
point only towards disorder, randomness and dislocation, there does seem to be a 
balance between the forces that interest contemporary science and also, in Prigogine 
and Stengers' work, emerging evidence of order. 
Einstein's theory of relativity led to Hawking's and Penrose's work which "implied 
that the universe must have a beginning and, possibly, an end" (Hawking 1988, p34), 
in which case the universe is not unchanging and so time is not irreversible. Also the 
second law of thermodynamics states that the universe is losing energy, winding down 
away from organisation and toward disorder, and these concepts, in interaction with 
quantum theory, will be developed into a discussion about order and disorder, 
determinism and chance. 
So, this expanding universe, combined with the second law of thermodynamics, 
describes a world in which time is irreversible and the future fundamentally 
unpredictable. Classical science with its foundations in reason, had removed time from 
the equation and hence been able to assert the permanence and universality of its laws: 
In the world model constructed by Newton and his followers, time was an 
afterthought. A moment, whether in the present, past or future, wa~ assumed to be 
exactly like any other moment. The endless cycling of the planets - mdeed. the 
operations of a clock or simple machine - can, in principle, go either backward or 
forward in time without altering the basics of the system ... [when] the second law of 
thermodynamics was proclaimed, time suddenly became a central c~ncem. For. 
according to the Second Law, there is an inescapable loss o.f energy m the Ulllverse. 
And, if the world machine is really running down ... Then It follo~s that one 
moment is no longer exactly like the last. You cannot run the ufilverse backward to 
make up for entropy. (Tomer 1984, xix). 
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Einstein, although it was his work that had put time back into the equation, was unable 
to accommodate the idea of irreversibility. He could equate such a concept with 
"lived" or "philosophical" time but not with science; for him "the intelligible was 
identified with the immutable". His friend Besso "kept asking the same questions: 
What is irreversibility: What is its relationship with the laws of physics? And untiringly 
Einstein would answer ... : irreversibility is merely an illusion produced by 'improbable' 
initial conditions" (prigogine and Stengers 1983, p293-294). So Einstein was 
concurring with the classically scientific view that phenomenological time, the 
experience of time, is something beyond the remit of science, Prigogine and Stengers 
quote the philosopher RudolfCarnap: 
Once Einstein said that the problem of the Now worried him seriously. He 
explained that the experience of the Now means something special for man, 
something essentially different from the past and the future, but that this important 
difference does not and cannot occur within physics. That this experience cannot be 
grasped by science seemed to him a matter of painful but inevitable resignation ... 
Einstein thought that these scientific descriptions cannot possibly satisfy our human 
needs; that there is something essential about the Now which is just outside of the 
realm of science. (prigogine and Stengers 1984, p2I-l-). 
In this way Einstein agrees with Kuhn's belief that in the "normal" processes of 
science, philosophy and seemingly abstract questions have no place. The domain of 
science as Einstein understood it is changing;, philosophical and ethical questions have 
re-entered the arena of science, and science is now tackling some of the questions that 
were once the realm of philosophy, which in Kuhn's analysis (see Chapter Three) 
would be an indication that we are in a period of "extraordinary" science. 
It was suggested above that a balance can often be found between the forces of the 
contemporary world and although the arrow of time points to increased entropy and so 
increased disorder, there is another aspect of time which pulls in quite a different 
direction. Entropy suggests the break down of order in our universe, "as energy 
leaked out of the system, its ability to sustain organized structures weakened, and 
these, in turn, broke down into less organized, hence more random elements" (Tomer 
1984, xx). Which would seem to lead to a view of the world where all the tenets of 
classical science are uprooted, where "most of reality, instead of being orderly, stable. 
and equilibral, is seething and bubbling with change, disorder and process" (T oiller 
90 
1984, xv). Yet while entropy is a winding down of the system of order, in direct 
contrast evolutionary time explains a system that is increasingly complex: "Evolution 
proceeds from simple to complex, from 'lower' to 'higher' forms of life, from 
undifferentiated structures to differentiated structures. And, from a human point of 
view, all this is quite optimistic. The universe gets 'better' organized as it ages ... " 
(Tofiler 1984, xx). (4) 
In examining the forces of globalisation it can be shown that, very often ,one force, 
which may seem to have a negative impact on the world, can be seen to be countered 
by another with a more positive effect. When quantum theory is examined a balance of 
negative and positive energies will be seen, but before developing this Prigogine' s and 
Stengers' reinterpretation of the second law of thermodynamics which suggests that 
"Under certain conditions, entropy itself becomes the progenitor of order" (Toffler 
1998, xxi) will be examined. 
The best way to illustrate order arising out of disorder is to use Prigogine's and 
Stengers' own example as described by Alvin Toffler: 
"Imagine a million white ping-pong balls mixed with a million black ones, bouncing 
around chaotically in a tank with glass windows in it. Most of the time, the mass seen 
though the window would appear to be gray, but now and then, at irregular moments, 
the sample seen through the glass might seem black or white, depending on the 
distribution of the balls at that moment in the vicinity of the window. Now imagine that 
suddenly the window goes all white then all black, the all white again, and on and on, 
changing its color completely at fixed intervals - like a clock ticking. By all the 
traditional rules, this should not happen at all. Yet, if we leave ping-pong behind and 
look at molecules in certain chemical reactions, we find that precisely such a self-
organization and ordering can and does occur ... " (Tomer, 1984, xvi). 
The observations ofPrigogine and Stengers have led them to assert an 
interdependency between chance and determinism. They identify three possible states 
for a system: equilibrium, far from equilibrium and near equilibrium, and within these 
systems are subsystems "which are continually 'fluctuating' "(Toffler 1984, xv-xvi) 
(4) This description of the tendencies of ~vo~ution is gene~~ the processes of cyolution do not 
exclusively tend toward increased complicatIOn or towards higher" forms of hfe. 
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At ~es, a single fluc~ti?n or a co~b~tion of them may become so powerful, .... 
that It shatters the preeXIstIng orgamzatIon. At this revolutionary moment - the 
authors call it a 'singular moment' or a 'bifurcation point' - it is inherently 
impossible to determine in advance which direction change will take: wh~ther the 
system will disintegrate into 'chaos' or leap to a more differentiated, higher level of 
'order' ... (Tomer 1984, xv). 
Prigogine and Stengers suggest that at these singular moments chance plays a part, we 
can not predict this, and then subsequently determinism takes over until another 
"bifurcation point" is met. "At this point ... , it is inherently impossible to determine in 
advance the next state of the system. Chance nudges what remains of the system down 
a new path of development. And once that path is chosen (from among many), 
determinism takes over again ... " (Tofiler 1984, xxiii). There is then order, but it 
cannot be predicted and, unlike the order of classical science, it is not imposed upon 
the world, but is the self ordering of the world, and in this self ordering both chance 
and determinism have an equal part to play. 
Moving on now to theories of quantum activity. Quantum activity is concerned with 
what happens at the smallest level however, because the universe, in the big bang 
theory, has itself emerged from an atomic point, quantum theory also helps us to 
understand things on the largest scale. 
The big question, in philosophy and religion as well as science, is why the Universe 
should exist at all - why is there something rather than nothing? .' .Einstein taught 
us that mass is a highly concentrated form of stored energy. But Einstein also 
taught us that gravitation (warped space-time) is a form of energy - and the bizarre 
thing is that a gravitational field actually stores negative energy. It is quite likely 
that all of the mass energy in the Universe is precisely cancelled out by all of its 
gravitational energy. The Universe may be nothing more - or less than the ultimate 
quantum fluctuation. (Gribbin 1998, p242). 
In atomic theory, an atom will have, or seek, a balance of negative and positive energy 
in the form of electrons, protons and neutrons and Gribbin has suggested above that 
the universe itself seems to have a balance of energy. Before proceeding with this a 
basic understanding of quantum uncertainty needs to be reached. 
Quantum theory emerged from the study of radiation of electromagnetic waves from 
hot bodies which led Max Planck to hypothesise that "light, X rays, and other w"aves 
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could not be emitted at an arbitrary rate, but only in certain packets called quanta. 
Moreover, each quantum had a certain amount of energy that was greater the higher 
the frequency of the waves, so at a high enough frequency the emission of a single 
quantum would require more energy than was available. Thus the radiation at hio-h :;:, 
frequencies would be reduced and so the rate at which the body lost energy would be 
finite" (Hawking 1988, p54). This resolved an anomaly in held theory which seemed 
to suggest that the energy radiated by hot bodies would be infinite, however it also 
presented a further problem, this time for determinism, when Heisenberg suggested the 
uncertainty principle in 1926 (Hawking 1988, p54). This stated that "the more 
accurately you try to measure the position of the particle, the less accurately you can 
measure its speed, and vice versa" (Hawking 1988, p55). So "particles no longer had 
separate, well-defined positions and velocities that could not be observed. Instead, 
they had a quantum state, which was a combination of position and velocity" 
(Hawking 1988, p55), and this state could not be accurately measured. 
The nuclei of atoms are held together by quarks, specifically by a quark -antiquark pair 
known as a meson, these quarks emerge from nothing to make mesons, by borrowing 
energy. They will exist for a length of time correspondent to the amount of energy 
they have, the more energy the shorter the life, and then disappear, giving their energy 
back to the vacuum. The amount of energy and hence the length of existence of 
mesons is not precisely quantifiable at this level, nor can the timing of the creation of 
mesons be predicted, this is an other example of quantum uncertainty (Gribbin 1998, 
p63). 
So at the quantum level there is activity that not only can not be visualised, but can not 
be accurately measured or predicted either. Einstein was unable to accept quantum 
theory as an answer to the workings of the world, he did not fault the theory in itself, 
but was sure that a more satisfactory encompassing explanation would in time emerge, 
he simply could not accept that nature is fundamentally unpredictable, random. His 
position might be compared to Copernicus - caught between two worlds -
instrumental in changing the scientific world view - yet unable in terms of belief, which 
were still grounded in the traditional world view, to reconcile the consequences. "I 
93 
hold it true that pure thought can grasp reality, as the ancients dreamed" he said in 
1933 (quoted in Banville 1976, p208) and the quantum model of the universe in 
, 
particular, was too removed from Einstein's everyday experience of the world, too far 
from his "grasp of reality" to be held as "true". This is unsurprising for quantum 
theory is "weird", the models we have of quantum mechanics are removed from our 
everyday experience, and they refer to things we cannot see, an attempt to understand 
science at the quantum level, and indeed at the universal level, requires the forgetting 
of held beliefs. 
However, quantum theory, as will be shown, can offer a harmonious cosmic theory 
where the largest and the smallest are made of the same stuff, and work in the same 
ways, and where there is a balance of energy in the universe. A cosmic theory was 
reluctantly given up in the progress towards a classically scientific explanation of the 
world and yet through science this concept is renewed. 
Firstly, it is thought to be because of unpredictable quantum fluctuations that our 
universe exists at all. Contributing to the idea of a correspondent relationship between 
life at the smallest level to life on the largest scale, this theory proposes that it is due 
to quantum fluctuations that occurred during the birth of the universe that the universe 
is inhabited by galaxies. If it were not for these fluctuations with caused "ripples", the 
universe would be entirely uniform, neither we, nor our world would exist. 
If the models are correct, without the primordial quantum fluctuation there would 
have been no Universe at all; and without these secondary quantum fluctuations 
there would be no people around to puzzle over the origin of the Universe. because 
evezything would have been smooth and unifon:n, so no stars would have formed. 
No other model yet devised can explain why the Universe is both very unifonn 
overall (thanks to inflation), but contains exactly the right kind of ripples needed to 
make galaxies and clusters of galaxies (also thanks to inflation). (Gribbin 1998, 
p247). 
Gribbin also suggests that the balance of energy at the quantum level is retlected in a 
balance between positive and negative energy in the universe as a whole. He says that 
the balance may be such that it equals zero, indeed that the universe may be "the 
ultimate quantum fluctuation": 
9~ 
Quantum uncertainty, ':" allows "empi?' space" to be alive with packets of energy 
that appear out of nothing at all, .and disappear within the time limit set by the 
quantum rules, Th~ less ener~ mvolved the more time the 'virtual' energy packet 
a quantum fluctuatIOn, ~ eXl~ before the Universe notices and it has to disappear. 
Thus a quantum flu~tuatIon which had precisely zero energy overall could, as far as 
the quantum world IS concerned, last for ever! (Gribbin 1998, p2'+'+). 
Just as Copernicus' theories would lead to changes in the world view so that the 
conflicts which had dogged his work could be resolved, so Einstein's conflicts were 
later to be resolved by the development of his own theories: 
This change of perspective is not the result of some arbitrary decision. In physics it 
was forced upon us by new discoveries no one could have foreseen .... Who would 
have expected that with the experimental confirmation of an expanding universe we 
could conceive of the history of the world as a whole? (prigogine and Stengers 
1984, p9). 
The new temporal and spatial perspectives by which we are now able to view the 
history of the universe, the earth, and humans, contributes along with an increased 
understanding of the impact of human activity upon the earth, to a repositioning of the 
role of science and the scientist: 
In our postmodem times of global crisis, science cannot abandon matters of 
ecological disaster such as global warming, pollution and nuclear fall-out. 
Postmodern science looks at itself as socially and textually constructed and is 
conscious of the role of the scientist in the whole process of knowledge creation; a 
space for ethical issues is thereby (re-)opened. (Toumlin 1982 cited in Heller 1996, 
p75). 
In terms of our relationship with our environment, science, which in the seventeenth 
century had enforced a barrier between the mechanised body and the natural world, has 
come to show us the interdependency, as a fragile eco-system, of everything on earth. 
And also, that at a quantum level everything is built from the same blocks; connections 
are thus re-established with our natural world through science . 
... because of technological advances, \ve have been able to see the planet in its 
entirety, and have become aware of global interdependencies of many kinds. If, in 
addition, we admit that human societies are in constant change, and that every state 
of 'being' is but the effect of a temporary historical configuration, we can no longer 
think the subject, singular or collective, in a vacuum. At the very moment when 
technology has seemingly acquired mastery over nature, . nature' returns and is 
rehistoricized. (Conley 1993, p78). 
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To return to a point made by Ferguson earlier: if there is a vantage point from where 
an "edge" to the universe can be viewed, it is by looking back in time, irreversibility 
does offer an aspect of the world that is unchanging. Although quantum physics 
demonstrates that the activity of matter at the fundamental level, at the quantum level, 
is unpredictable, so rendering the future unpredictable, irreversibility offers the past as 
fixed. The concept of "deep time", the recent realisation that our world has existed for 
around four billion years, may seem disorienting, it is an amount of time so large it is 
almost unimaginable, and yet geologists know that the strata of rocks, or deep ice 
cores, for example, contain a record of climatic changes. This not only allows a 
means by which to visually and conceptually grasp an understanding of the age of our 
world - it is fixed. So in this way irreversibility does allow a constant. ··We think of 
weather as transient, changeable, and above all, ephemeral; but everywhere nature 
remembers. Trees, for example, carry the memory of rainfall. In their rings we read 
ancient weather - storms, sunlight, and temperatures, the growing seasons of centuries. 
A forest shares a history, which each tree remembers even after it has been felled" 
(Michaels 1998, p211). Just as in the cells of our bodies, in our DNA, we each carry 
our own history, a map of our ancestors. Genetic scientists are able to trace a persons 
racial history back thousands of years by looking at their DNA and matching it to 
those of ancient peoples, these ideas are important in critical examination of theories 
which explain the self as entirely culturally constructed, as a blank sheet inscribed by 
culture (see Chapter One). 
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4.3 CONCLUSION. 
In the previous chapters it has been shown how a cosmic explanation of the world was 
gradually abandoned due to the seeming incoherence of spatial discoveries. This 
chapter has shown that contemporary science describes a universe which at many 
levels is unpredictable and random. Yet out of these discoveries there appears to be a 
balance between chance and determinism, entropy and evolution, negative and positive 
energies and between the smallest and largest aspects of the universe. As time re-
enters the arena of science so do philosophical questions and ethical issues. 
In the last chapter a great deal was said about language and models by which to make 
sense of the world. In relation to the thesis as a whole this raises important questions. 
The central hypothesis is that during a period of revolution in knowledge, in 
concurrence with a revolution in spatial and temporal perspective, the body itself is 
revolutionised: the meanings of the body in interaction with its environment are 
changed. The key question then is, does this actually allow a new experience? Is there 
simply a new framework by which to express the feeling of being a body, or does it 
mean a new experience of the body? In this chapter a new world and universal view 
has been shown to be emerging, which certainly offers us a new model by which to 
frame and conceive of our corporal experience, and shows this experience as defined 
by new concepts of space and time. In the first chapter disruptions to our sense of 
location and new modes of communication, brought about by globalisation and 
technology, are shown to effect shifts in subjective identity, which establishes that an 
identifiable change is occurring in the actual experience of the world. This 
demonstrates a revolution not only in perspective and modes of expression but in the 
activity of the self in relation to others and the environment. The articulation between 




It's no meta?hor to feel the influence of ~e dead in the world, just as it's no metaphor to 
hear the radiOcarbon chronometer> the Gel?er counter amplifYing the faint breathing of 
rock, fifty thousa~d years old. (LIke the famt thump from behind the womb wall) It is 
no metaphor t~ ~tness the astonishing fidelity of minerals, magnetized, even after 
hundreds of millIons of years, pointing to the magnetic pole, minerals that have never 
forgo~en magma whose cooling offhas left them ever desirous. We long for place but 
place Itselflongs. (Michaels p53, 1996). 
5.1 SUMMARY. 
The research question posed in the Introduction was: "If the convergence of new 
spatio/temporal perspectives with new modes of communication and new 
scientific/technological models operate in articulation with a new formation of the subject 
and new ways of understanding and experiencing the body what will be the impact of 
comparable current developments on the contemporary body?" 
By demonstrating that we are in a period of transformation comparable to that of the 
Enlightenment, it has been shown that changes to our systems of knowledge as radical of 
those initiated in the earlier period can be expected and it has been demonstrated that this 
period is useful as a comparative model of the way trends in knowledge become manifest 
at a corporeal level. Secondly, the project has explored the relations between technologies 
of communication, spatial and temporal frames, and the languages and models by which 
we describe and understand the working of the world, as corresponding with shifts in 
conceptual and perceptual knowledge's of embodied selves/subjects in the world. Finally 
this project has argued that the theory and methodology by which the above relations are 
established also permit the identification of qualitative shifts in subjective experiences of 
the body. 
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The validity of the research question has been substantiated by demonstrating that in times 
where there is a significant spatial shift which coincides with technological advances _ 
especially in the areas of communication and media - there is a corresponding shift in 
subjective identity. This has been discussed in historical and contemporary contexts and 
has been achieved through a synthesis of the work of others. 
In the historical analysis it has been shown that the metaphors and language of an 
emergent way of knowing the world, in the Enlightenment, were directly transposed onto 
understandings of the body. This has opened up the argument that current metaphors and 
language of science and technology will be transposed onto the contemporary body. 
Digitization, the interface, and the matrix have all been discussed as useful contemporary 
metaphors for conceptualising the body and connectivity, fluidity and spatio-temporal 
location have been identified as common new themes to these and other areas: in relation 
to notions of the cultural, geographic and theoretical. 
Shifts in media and communication result in a reconfiguration of the sensory hierarchy: 
where different senses have authority and so are validated in relation to new media - and 
thus in relation to structures of knowledge more broadly. Tactility has been identified as 
the sense that aligns itself most closely with new forms of media and so with "knowing". 
It has also been argued that the role of the imaginary is heightened in significance in 
relation to understanding contemporary scientific models, see Chapter Four, and in 
relation to virtual technologies, see Chapter One. The question this demands is: how 
might tactility and imagination, when given authority in relation to "knowing", reshape the 
ways in which we understand our corporeality. 
As a development of the above points this work has argued that corporeal knowledge, 
which was in Enlightenment discourse made distinct from "truth" is, in contemporary 
thought, more closely associated with knowledge. A dominant theme has been the 
significance of mapping - the illustrative forms of spatial and spatio-temporal technologies 
_ as a rich source for explanations of subject location, and for bodily metaphors. It has 
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~n been demonstrated that historically the language of cartography has been definitive of 
emergent structure of knowledge, and of the body as part of this. Given this, :\~1RI, a 
ience, a technology and a topography is to be discussed in this chapter as potentially 
formative of the tendencies of contemporary corporeality. 
2 DISCUSSION. 
b.e models of twentieth and twentyfirst Century science departed fundamentally from the 
nets of Classical Science, corroborating evidence that fundamental ways of knowing the 
'Orld have shifted. This shift at its most basic is from the spatial to the spatio-temporal. 
his shift is inherent also to all new technologies and communications. How do we locate 
ur own spatio-temporal bodily experience in relation to this change? It has been argued 
~re that our own physical living body becomes heightened in significance as a point of 
~ference in a fluid, multiple world. It has also been argued that as, part of these 
'ansformations, corporeality and knowledge are no longer oppositional definitions. 
'he use of metaphor has been key to the Classically Scientific approach or way of 
linking. Contemporary metaphors are those of flows and exchange, of interactions and 
onnections, the network. In the models of science and technology, and in the processes 
f globalisation, boundaries collapse. These ways of understanding the world are 
nderstood here as also explanatory of bodily existence. Ifboundaries are being disrupted 
len the boundary between interiority and exteriority would also be expected to be 
lisrupted, shifted or confused. 
~hese are tendencies that this project has demonstrated as significant. Significant because, 
vhen seen as a wide picture, show altered spatio-temporal frames, altered material 
:xperience of physical location, new modes of communication, new theories of 
;ubjectivity, intense cultural interaction (all elements found present in the period of 
~nlightenment) which contribute toward a new sense of corporeality, 
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In the Enlightenment the body occupied a defensive position between the newly revealed 
anatomical interior and the newly "discovered" expanse of the globe. In contemporary 
terms, the body is conceptualised as occupying a position between the real and virtual 
worlds and between the quantum and the universal scales. The relationship between the 
particular and the universal is no longer oppositional then but involved, interactive. 
Contemporary scientific explains a new unity of matter and these explanations depend 
overtly on the imagination in order to be understood and, through virtual technology, 
imaginary realms are opened up which have a consequent impact upon experience in the 
real world (poster 1996). How might an increased emphasis on the role of the imaginary 
together with new qualitative experience, fluid and multiple concepts of subjectivity and a 
newly validated tactility come together? If it is through imagination and experience that 
the worlds of the real and the virtual, the quantum and the universal are linked, then the 
point of convergence for imagination and experience is at the site of the body or, 
alternatively, the mediator, translator between these realms is the body, the tactile body 
newly authorised in relation to knowledge. 
It is the image that has been the focus of many postmodern theories, image in terms of 
visual representation - the mediums by which the signs of the postmodem age are 
communicated - :film, advertising, magazines for example and, in a different way, in terms 
of theories developing from psychoanalysis or theories of the subject, self-image and the 
interactions of self with culture. This work is not so interested in the image. It is 
interested in the imagination, the conceptual, in interaction with the sensory, experiencing 
body. The visual is not excluded from these processes, but, crucially, it is not prioritised. 
It is the sensory experience opened up by the altered parameters of available conceptual 
tools that is of concern here. Within these shifted parameters the experience and 
definitions of the body are less constrained by the visual. As discussed above, seeing is no 
longer believing, and the solid image before us in the mirror is not enough of an 
explanation for corporeality, other sensory and imaginary ways of knowing are also 
required to make sense of a changed and changing environment and new subjectivities. 
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These alterations are conceptuaL metaphorical subiective and mat ·al As P , ~ en. oster says: 
"the new technologies install the 'interface', the face between the faces~ the face that 
insists that we remember that we have 'faces', that we have sides that are present at the 
moment of utterance, that we are not present in any simple or immediate way." (Poster 
1996, 196/197). 
As contemporary science offers a new unity of matter, and mind/matter distinctions are 
confused, then a corresponding confusion of the categories of "imagined" and "known" 
would seem possible, such a confusion would result in a significant refiguration of the 
ways in which corporeality can be expressed and understood. 
6.3 FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING. 
The purpose here is to offer just one example of where qualitative evidence for a shift in 
corporeal experience might be explored. Science, technology and the body all meet in this 
example, a form of mapping, so it compares well to cartography and anatomy, the 
examples used in a historical context. 
I started looking at:fI\tIRI purely because it was a striking example of a disruption between 
concepts of bodily interiority and exteriority, I was not considering it in terms of mapping 
or in relation to the rest of the project at all. However it became quickly evident that it 
fitted with all the key areas of interest, that it was a topography, that it was a quantum 
science, that it was technological, and that it thoroughly disrupted classical notions of 
science and the body. I will briefly outline how MRI works before discussing the ways in 
which this could prove to be a useful case study. 
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"Functional MRI (fl\1RI) has enabled scientists to look for the first time into the human 
brain in vivo, to literally 'watch it while it works'. This has revealed exciting insights into 
the spatial and temporal changes underlying a broad range of brain functions, such as how 
we see, feel, move, understand each other and lay down memories" (Matthews 2002. pi). 
The brain, like other tissues in the body, is made up of over 70% water. Each hydrogen 
atom in this water is a tiny magnet. When placed within a very strong magnetic field, 
these billions and billions of magnets align. When these atoms return to their original 
position they give off energy which can be detected with a "receiver coil". This allows 
relative amounts of hydrogen to be measured. The varying water content between the 
cortex and the white matter of the brain mean that.MRI "can be used to provide exquisite 
details of structure" of the brain (Matthews 2002, p3). (1) 
So, :MRI allows detailed structural knowledge of the brain and "with the development of 
functional imaging, we are now able to look inside the brain of humans in 'real time' and 
appreciate the neural mechanisms behind our behaviour, rather than just observing the 
consequences of these effects" (Matthews 2002, p4). As freshly oxygenated blood gives 
off a different signal, active areas of the brain can be recognised and mapped, and the 
flows of activity can be mapped. 
This process is allowing analysis ofvarious brain functions and pathologies. For example, 
memory loss, cognitive learning processes, depression, Alzheimer's, Attention Deficit 
Hyperactive Disorder, grief in bereavement and addiction. Integral to the imaging of these 
magnetic forces is computerised analysis. 
So fMRI fits as a model with the examples used in the historical analysis, it fits with the 
key areas of interest identified in Chapter One, it exemplifies the departure from Classical 
(1) MRI is widely used as a diagnostic method for all bodily functions, but it is the diagnosls of brain 
function that is of particular interest here. 
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Science demonstrated in Chapter Four and is in alignment 'th th th be . . 
WI e eory cause It IS 
interested in flows of activity and it disrupts the most significant distinction, that between 






Its object of study is the living functioning body and brain. 
It is a topography, a form of mapping. 
It is at the forefront of scientific and technological progress. 
It is facilitated by and dependent upon computerised interpretations, digital analysis. 
It uses information taken at the quantum level to inform diagnosis at the corporeal 
level. 
• It facilitates a completely new experience of physical interiority and exteriority. 
• 
• 
It disrupts classica1 distinctions between body and mind, emotion and reason, science 
and art. 
It is defined and mapped spatio-temporally and has the capability of operating in real 
time. 
As has been discussed in relation to the Enlightenment, cartography was definitive, in 
terms of both language and approach, to the structures of knowledge that developed from 
the explorations of the "new" world and of the anatornica1 interior. Here it is suggested 
that contemporary forms of mapping will be equally powerful as indicators of the new 
ways in which the body will be understood. Looking at this new medical technology the 
departure from a classically scientific view can, even at this early stage, be identified at 
every level. 
Firstly, science and technology, are utilised here, in a medical context, to study such 
conditions as depression and grief in bereavement, or to map thinking processes. This 
thoroughly collapses the classical distinctions between body and mind, emotion and reason 
and mind and matter. Magnetic Resonance Im~aing has been used also to study creativity 
and artistic impulses in the brain. These regions were not even considered to be withm the 
remit of scientific study in the earlier era Secondly this technology allows the interior of 
the body and brain to be witnessed functioning in real time, so confusing classical concepts 
of the body as an impenetrable boundary between the interior and exterior worlds and 
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effecting shifts in bodily location. In these ways it is in alignment with the other 
contemporary phenomena already explored. 
The interaction of space and time are central to this process; in terms of the science _ 
quantum physics is inherently a spatio/temporal science, in terms of what it is examinino _ 
o 
the spatial and temporal changes in the brain and, in the way it operates - providing 
spatio/temporal images in real time, via digital interpretation. It is a thoroughly 
spatio/temporal topography and on this basis alone would be an interesting case study. 
FMRI however, links also to imagination and experience. Understanding how the science 
works is dependent upon imagination, and this science then maps brain fimctions of 
various experiences, resulting in the experience of seeing your own brain as it works, 
which requires another imaginative leap in order to be comprehended as reality. These 
realms of understanding the world were invalidated by classically scientific thinking, in 
new science they are fundamental. 
If one of the aims of the project is to look for trends in contemporary scientific and 
technological topographies as strong indicators of the ways in which corporeality might be 
refigured, then a case study of this new topography has the potential to bring all the key 
elements into play. What it would appear to reveal without further analysis is a 
corporeality that is on some levels turned inside out. How might a qualitative analysis of 
the experiences of patients and practitioners involved in the processes and interpretations 
ofNMRI reveal a newly interpreted body, symbolically and materially,) What language 
and metaphors does this science employ in analysis? How might this help explain the 
tendencies of corporeal experience? 
It is not suggested that an analysis offMRI will tell us everything we want to know about 
corporeality. It is suggested that given the power previous technologies of mapping have 
held in relation to corporeal understandings that this would be one good place to look, 
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among many, for rich information about the direction of our corporeality, aneL most 
significantly, this topography disrupts notions of corporeal interiority and exteriority. 
6.4 CONCLUSIONS. 
In the historical analysis it was shown that new approaches to knowledge became 
definitive of meanings and experiences of corporeality. Further, it was shown that we are 
in a period of comparable transformation and that it may be illuminating to look at the 
trends in new structures of knowledge to see how these might inform the potential of 
corporeal understandings. It was also demonstrated that the particular interactions of 
space, language and technology in various forms of mapping are a valuable source of 
information about corporeal understandings. The examination of the contemporary 
situation found that the periods of analysis were comparable in multiple ways, but that the 
significant development in all disciplines and arenas today is the dissolution of boundaries, 
metaphorically, materially and physically; a move towards fluidity, new spatio-temporal 
location, and connectivity. In part this involves a reconfiguration of the hierarchy of the 
senses, where tactility and imagination have a new authority in relationship with 
knowledge. This Conclusion brings together various findings to argue that the indications 
are that a new experience of corporeality will tend towards these same factors: 
connectivity, fluidity, particular spatio-temporallocation, and has suggested an area of 
proposed research where qualitative, experiential evidence might be found to demonstrate 
this - in a new form of medical mapping .. 
The dualist discourse of the Enlightenment was founded on light and dark, known an 
unknown, valid and invalieL and the whole approach to corporeality in this era can be seen 
to grow from these philosophical key stones, the organ best associated with this form of 
knowledge was the eye. The organ of the contemporary world is the skin, the sense is 
touch/connection. The identified tendencies have been shown to be significant and 
prevalent - can they be proven as evident in our qualitative experience'> Do the new 
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models, the new languages, the new material experience of the world allow more than new 
words, more than new descriptive tools for explaining sensory and psychological 
experience of the world, more than a new material/physical/symbolic location, more than 
new cultural freedoms, do they permit a new corporeal experience? 
10'" 
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